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CORPORATE SPEECH, SECURITIES REGULATION, AND AN
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT

MICHAEL R. SIEBECKER*
ABSTRACT

Does the First Amendment shield politically tinged corporate
speech from the compelled disclosure and reporting requirements
embedded in the U.S. securities laws? The question arises in the
securitiesregulationcontext because ofan impendingjurisprudential
trainwreck between the Supreme Court'scommercial speech doctrine
and its approach to corporatepoliticalspeech. As corporationsbegin
mixing commercial messages with political commentary, First
Amendment jurisprudencesimply provides insufficient guidance on
the role government should play in regulatingthat speech. Although
First Amendment jurisprudence generally counsels against
governmental restrictions on corporate political speech without
regard to the truth or falsity of the message, a different branch of
that same jurisprudence suggests governmental regulation of
commercial speech remains essential to ensure consumers receive
accurate information and to maintain market efficiency.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never articulatedsufficiently
clear definitions of "commercial" or "political" speech, or the
boundaries between them, to address claims of politically tinged
corporate speech. Because the securities laws essentially operate
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through content-based regulation of compelled speech, which often
touches inherently political matters, the securities laws seem
especially vulnerable to constitutionalattack.
Consideringthe limitations of current speech jurisprudence,this
Article examines whether the "institutionalapproach" to the First
Amendment advocated by Frederick Schauer provides a theoretical
basis for maintaining a robust securities regulation regime.
Following that approach, a determination of speech rights in any
particularinstitutionalsetting should depend on an assessment of
the societal importance of the institution as well as the relationship
between speech rights and the institution's basic role. The Article
concludes that an institutional approach to First Amendment
jurisprudence not only provides sufficiently strong reasons for
insulating the securities regulation regime from the First
Amendment's reach, but also lends strong support for embracing a
new institutionalapproachto FirstAmendment jurisprudenceitself.
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INTRODUCTION

Does the First Amendment protect from regulation any corporate
speech that touches some political chord or matter of public concern?
If so, does the First Amendment shield politically tinged corporate
speech from the compelled disclosure and reporting requirements
embedded in the U.S. securities laws and regulations? For those
especially concerned with the integrity of the U.S. capital markets,
obtaining an answer to that second question remains a paramount
concern. Crafting a general theory addressing the political speech
rights of corporations, however, need not necessarily precede a
determination of the proper reach of the U.S. securities laws.
Instead, an examination of the institutional justifications for
maintaining a robust securities regulation regime, based on
Frederick Schauer's newly developed "institutional approach" to the
First Amendment,' might provide sufficiently strong reasons for
insulating the American system of compelled corporate reporting
and disclosure from constitutional attack.
Motivating the need for a new institutional analysis is an
impending jurisprudential train wreck in the realm of securities
regulation. Speeding from one direction is the "commercial speech"
doctrine, a much-criticized set of standards articulated by the
Supreme Court that permits substantial regulation of false or
misleading commercial speech. Charging from the opposite course
is the Supreme Court's somewhat disjointed First Amendment
jurisprudence regarding corporate political speech that does not
take the truth or falsity of the communication into account. The
track itself-the conduit for the collision-is the system of compelled
disclosure and reporting contained in the U.S. securities laws and
regulations. Fueling the engines on both sides are a confluence of
external pressures: a recent surge in socially responsible investing
(SRI), defined as the integration of social, environmental, and
political criteria into the investment decision-making process; 2 a
1. Frederick Schauer, Towards an InstitutionalFirst Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256

(2005).
2. Soc. INV. FORUM, 2005 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES 3 (2006), http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/research/trends/sritrendsreport_
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concomitant growing need for corporations to establish a public
record on those issues relevant to the SRI community; and an
increasingly vigilant shareholder advocacy movement monitoring
and testing the truth of corporate communications.
Perhaps surprisingly, few scholars even recognize that the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the areas of commercial speech
and corporate political speech are hurtling towards each other along
the same track. Certainly many question the commercial speech
doctrine's basic design and reach.3 Others separately criticize the
intellectual integrity of the Supreme Court's justifications for
subjecting corporations to significant regulation in the electoral
context while granting them significant political speech rights in
other areas.4 Still, there seems to be no general recognition that the
clean distinction between political and commercial speech cannot
endure. As a result, little attention has been paid to what impact
the impending collision of those two areas of First Amendment
jurisprudence might have on other areas of the law.
Some recent cases make clear, however, that the Supreme Court's
forced divide between commercial speech and corporate political
speech is intellectually unstable. Companies have begun to assert
that when factual disclosures are intertwined with even minimal
political commentary, the entire amalgam becomes fully protected
political speech under the First Amendment. For example, in Nike,
Inc. v. Kasky,5 a case fully argued before the Supreme Court prior
to being remanded for additional fact-finding, Nike argued that it
could not be held liable under a California consumer fraud statute
for any potentially false or misleading statements made to the press
about its overseas labor policies, because those statements were
part of an ongoing public debate about international labor
practices.6 In essence, Nike's claim effectively called for collapsing
the commercial speech doctrine into the Supreme Court's political
speech jurisprudence, forcing a union of standards not easily wed.

2005.pdf [hereinafter SIF REPORT].
3. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
5. 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam).
6. David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 1049, 1050 (2004).
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If corporations like Nike continue to blur the distinction between
the commercial and the political, maintaining the current jurisprudential divide would require the Supreme Court to address some
extremely difficult-yet very basic---questions that it has not yet
answered with any clarity: What is commercial speech? What is
political speech? When does commercial speech become political
speech? Drawing those definitional lines presents a monumental
jurisprudential task with far-reaching consequences perhaps too
difficult to predict. In light of the attempt to collapse the distinction
between political and commercial speech already brought before
the Supreme Court in Nike, and with other cases sure to follow,
such substantial theoretical excavation and remodeling of First
Amendment jurisprudence seems unavoidable.
But why do the U.S. securities laws provide the conduit for the
collision between political and commercial speech? Were corporations to find broad political protection under the First Amendment
for factual disclosures, the detailed system of mandatory reporting
and disclosure provided by the U.S. securities laws could be undone.
Private causes of action for securities fraud currently recognized by
the Supreme Court would lose their theoretical underpinnings, and
the system of forced public transparency for public corporations and
sales of securities would become muddied by political maneuvering.
Investors could be left foundering without reliable information upon
which to base investment decisions, and gross market inefficiencies
could potentially result if market prices rested on infirm or false
factual assumptions. Perhaps in no other institutional setting would
a revamping of the distinction between commercial and political
speech rights for corporations have a greater impact.
Some might suggest that questioning the First Amendment's
impact on the stability of the system of mandatory reporting and
disclosure under the U.S. securities laws simply raises a false
concern. After all, even though the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) regulates with a very heavy hand the precise
content of corporate disclosures, the Supreme Court has never
seriously suggested that the securities laws or the agency that
enforces them are vulnerable to attack under the First Amendment.
Although decades ago some predicted a similar collision between the
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securities laws and the First Amendment, none occurred.' In fact,
the Court has hinted on several occasions that the securities
regulation regime sits comfortably outside the protective reach of
the First Amendment.8
The problem, however, stems from the lack of any principled
grounds for carving out securities regulation from the scope of
the First Amendment. Although normative reasons for denying
corporations expansive speech rights certainly exist, so do countervailing justifications for providing extensive speech rights to
corporations that would undermine, perhaps significantly, the
current securities laws.9 In essence, the securities regulation
regime remains quite theoretically disconnected from the First
Amendment. At best, the continuing viability of the system of
compelled reporting and disclosure embedded in the securities laws
remains subject to a guessing game about which speech norms
might provide enough glue to hold the structure together, or to rend
the system apart, if serious challenges began to arise.
Although the securities laws might currently drift undisturbed
by waves of speech claims, a significant jurisprudential shift in the
First Amendment could easily lead to direct speech-based challenges to some of the most basic securities laws. The recent speech
claims of corporations require some restructuring of the definitions
of commercial and political speech, as well as redrawing the lines
between them. It is therefore important to examine whether any
sound theoretical basis exists for insulating the securities regulation
regime from the reach of the First Amendment. And if traditional
normative justifications for free speech do not provide adequate
guidance regarding the First Amendment's scope in the realm of
securities regulation, it seems prudent to investigate whether any
nonnormative theory might provide a more useful organizing
construct.
The "institutional approach" to the First Amendment advocated
by Frederick Schauer seems to provide just such a theoretical hook
7. See, e.g., James C. Goodale, 77Te First Amendment and Securities Act: A Collision
Course?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 8, 1983, at 1.
8. See infra Part II.C.

9. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Explorationof ConstitutionalSalience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1784-87 (2004).

620

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:613

for maintaining a robust securities regulation regime. Schauer's
analytical framework looks beyond normative speech theory to the
social, economic, and political factors that surround and affect
speech claims to explain the shape the First Amendment should
take.1" From that external vantage point, determining what level of
speech protection the First Amendment affords in a particular
institutional setting thus depends on an analysis of the societal
importance of the institution, as well as an assessment of how the
speech regulation itself relates to the institution's basic role.11
Although Schauer's approach might yield sound reasons for carving
out certain areas of law from the First Amendment's reach, neither
he nor anyone else has yet to apply the analysis to the institution of
securities regulation.
The project here, then, is to address in a comprehensive fashion
whether an institutional approach provides sufficient grounds for
insulating from the reach of the First Amendment the system of
compelled reporting and disclosure embedded in the U.S. securities
laws. Although the analysis rests on Schauer's conception of an
institutional approach to the First Amendment, the goal is to test
the theory's application in the setting of securities regulation rather
than to provide an exhaustive recapitulation and defense of the
basic tenets of the institutional approach itself.
To determine the First Amendment's reach under the institutional approach in the context of securities regulation, this Article
follows a simple path. Using Nike as a springboard for analysis,
Part I describes the impending collision between the commercial
speech doctrine and the Supreme Court's approach to corporate
political speech, giving particular attention to the confluence of
political and social factors that make that jurisprudential collision
imminent. Part II sets forth the current status and limitations of
the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine and its approach
to corporate political speech. In addition, Part II details the absence
of any jurisprudential anchor for the Supreme Court's apparent
exclusion of securities regulation from serious First Amendment
review. Moving from a description of the problem to a potential
solution, Part III articulates Schauer's general argument for a new
10. Schauer, supranote 1, at 1274; Schauer, supranote 9, at 1787.
11. Schauer, supra note 1, at 1274,
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institutional approach to First Amendment jurisprudence. Carefully
assessing a variety of social, legal, economic, and political concerns,
Part IV applies that institutional approach in the particular setting
of securities regulation. Part V revisits the questions presented in
Nike and attempts to see what answers, if any, the institutional
approach to the First Amendment might provide. This Article
concludes that an institutional approach to First Amendment
jurisprudence not only provides sufficiently strong reasons for
insulating to a great extent the institution of securities regulation
from the First Amendment's reach, but also lends strong support for
embracing a new institutional approach to First Amendment
jurisprudence itself.
I. THE IMPENDING JURISPRUDENTIAL COLLISION BETWEEN
COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH

The incompatibility between the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence regarding commercial speech and
corporate political speech is becoming increasingly apparent. The
basic problem lies in a renewed effort by corporations to mix
commercial and political speech in their public statements. 12 But
12. While the securities laws have not yet faced any direct challenge under the First
Amendment, companies have begun asserting that politically tinged corporate speech
deserves immunity from regulation or liability in a variety of other contexts. See, e.g., Sosa
v. DirecTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929-32, 942 (9th Cir. 2006) (satellite television company
successfully claimed that its demand letters sent to thousands of recipients, who allegedly
accessed the satellite signal without authorization, could not give rise to a RICO claim against
the company because the letters constituted protected speech under the First Amendment);
CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Skippy, Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 461-63 (4th Cir. 2000) (corporation and its
president successfully claimed that its postings on a Web site describing the company's lost
battle in a protracted trademark and copyright dispute could not be subject to an injunction,
because the Web postings were not commercial speech and therefore deserved full First
Amendment protection); Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 585-86
(2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting a corporation's claim that Internet domain names constituted political
speech immune from antitrust regulation, but nonetheless noting that "domain names may
be employed for a variety of communicative purposes with both functional and expressive
elements, ranging from the truly mundane ...
commercial speech and even core political
speech squarely implicating First Amendment concerns.... [Wie do not preclude the possibility
that certain domain names and new gTLDs, could indeed amount to protected speech");
New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1110-11 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (in deceptive trade
practice case, defendant Lavasoft successfully claimed that its statements about plaintiffs
software on Lavasoft's Web site and in code embedded in Lavasoft's Ad-Aware detection
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why is this a problem? To the extent corporations invest commercial
messages with political content, the Supreme Court's existing First
Amendment jurisprudence does not provide sufficient guidance on
the role government should play in regulating that speech. If the
corporate speech is political, First Amendment jurisprudence
strongly counsels against governmental restrictions without regard
to the truth or falsity of the message.'" If the corporate speech is
commercial, however, a different branch of that same jurisprudence
suggests governmental regulation remains essential to ensure
consumers receive accurate information and to maintain market
efficiency. 4 Of course, the jurisprudential paralysis results only if
corporations actually combine commercial and political speech. But
as explained below, a surge in socially responsible investing coupled
with a strong shareholder advocacy movement has caused just that
commingling of commercial and political corporate speech.
software were not commercial speech and were immune from liability); Bernardo v. Planned
Parenthood Fed. of Am., 115 Cal. App. 4th 322, 343-49 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (plaintiff's suit
against charitable organization for publishing allegedly false statements about the safety of
abortions was stricken under state anti-SLAPP ("strategic lawsuit against public
participation") statute, where court accepted charitable organization's claim that its speech
was political rather than commercial); DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal.
App. 4th 562, 565-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (in a false statements case, the court accepted
corporation's claim that its lobbying and public relations efforts represented political speech
within the protections of state anti-SLAPP statute); see also Tamara R. Piety, Grounding
Nike: Exposing Nike's Quest for a ConstitutionalRight To Lie, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 151, 188-99
(describing a variety of contexts in which corporations could claim political speech rights to
evade regulation or liability). See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Nike's recent attempt to evade a state consumer protection law by claiming its statements
to the press about its overseas labor practices were inextricably intertwined with political
commentary. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text regarding a much earlier attempt
by a company owner to evade the reach of a city ordinance prohibiting distribution of
commercial handbills by distributing double-sided leaflets containing a commercial
advertisement on the front and a political protest on the back.
13. See Nat'l Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam). See
generally infra Part II.B (discussing corporate political speech in general).
14. Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and Free Speech: Love and a Question, 42 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 789, 802 (1998) ('Ujnlike the complex dignitary justifications underlying First
Amendment protection of political speech, First Amendment protection of commercial speech
exists for only one reason-to assure a flow of accurate information to consumers necessary
to the functioning of efficient markets."); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 426 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) ("So long as we preserve a predominantly
free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in
the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.").
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A. The Rise of Socially Responsible Investing
Although efforts to encourage socially responsible corporate
behavior span centuries, the modern SRI movement in the United
States arose in the aftermath of the social upheaval in the 1960s.' 5
Since that rebirth, the SRI community has grown at a remarkable
pace. With increasing frequency, consumers and investors make
decisions about whether to purchase a company's stock or products
based in part on an assessment of the company's performance in a
variety of social, ethical, environmental, and political areas. 6
Whether based on positive compliance with desired practices, such
as paying a living wage to company workers, or avoidance of
undesired policies, such as animal testing of products, consumers
and investors are screening company policies and practices with
increasing regularity. v
As the broader investing community embraces corporate social
responsibility, the SRI movement enhances its influence in the
corporate world. With mainstream money managers increasingly
incorporating various social criteria into their investing, "[olver the
past decade, SRI has become a major force in the U.S. financial
marketplace.' By 2005, total assets under professional management in portfolios screened for one or more social issues had risen
to $2.29 trillion, an increase of 258% from 1995. That increase
reflects 9% greater growth than assets under professional manage-

15. SIF REPORT, supranote 2, at 3-4.
16. Id. at 2-3; see also Brand New Day, ECONOMIST, June 19, 1993, at 70, 71 (describing
the upcoming "era of corporate image, in which consumers will increasingly make purchases
on the basis of a firm's whole role in society: how it treats employees, shareholders and local
neighbourhoods"); Tom J. Brown & Peter A. Dacin, The Company and the Product:Corporate
Associationsand ConsumerProduct Responses, 61 J. MARKETING 68 (1997); Sankar Sen & C.B.
Bhattacharya, Does Doing Good Always Lead to Doing Better? Consumer Reactions to
CorporateSocial Responsibility, 38 J. MARKETING RES. 225 (2001).
17. See Is There Money in Morals?, MONEY MGMT., Feb. 1, 2006 ("The criteria used to
select companies for investment has evolved as well. Ethical funds now utilise both negative
and positive screening processes (using certain criteria to either exclude or include companies)
and are looking more closely at the issues to decide where it is appropriate to invest.").
18. Press Release, Soc. Inv. Forum, U.S. Socially Responsible Investment Assets Grew
Faster than Rest of Investment World over Last Decade (Jan. 24, 2006), available at http://
www.socialinvest.orglareasnews/2005Trends.htm [hereinafter U.S. Socially Responsible
Investment Assets] (quoting Tim Smith, President of Social Investment Forum).
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ment not screened based on social criteria within the same period. 9
Moreover, between 2003 and 2005 assets invested in SRI mutual
funds increased by 18.5%, with a 40% increase in funds dedicated
to community investing projects.2"
In addition, a vigorous shareholder advocacy movement has had
a growing impact on corporate policies and practices. Between 2003
and 2005, shareholder proposals on a variety of social and environmental issues increased by more than 16%, and the number of those
proposals that actually reached a vote at the annual shareholder
meeting increased by more than 22%.21 With respect to large
institutional investors that filed resolutions on social or environmental issues, assets under their control increased by 57% over that
same period, from $448 billion to $703 billion.2 2 In qualitative terms,
shareholders have played "a major role in improving corporate
behavior through resolutions, letter writing, and negotiations with
management on issues ranging from environmental risk and
workplace standards to diversity, human rights violations, and a
myriad of corporate governance concerns., 23 As an essential part of
the SRI community, shareholder advocacy has caused corporations
to confront how their businesses affect a variety of social, ethical,
political, and environmental matters.
By increasing the overall demand for corporations that embrace
socially responsible business practices, or through a willingness to
pay a "stock premium" for socially sound business practices, the SRI
community creates a monetary incentive for corporations to embrace
publicly the ethic of corporate social responsibility. That incentive
for public acceptance of socially responsible business practices
provides the next causal link in the jurisprudential collision.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Many shareholder proposals, however, are withdrawn from consideration because
the proposing shareholders reach agreements with management regarding implementation
of the underlying objectives. Therefore, the withdrawal of a proposal itself does not indicate
a failed attempt by shareholders to effect corporate change. See SIF REPORT, supra note 2, at
21-22.
22. U.S. Socially Responsible Investment Assets, supra note 18.
23. SIF REPORT, supranote 2, at 21.
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B. CorporateResponses to Socially Responsible Investing
The rise in SRI has sparked a concomitant increase in corporate
responses to public concerns about corporate social responsibility.
Recent studies indicate that more than half of the companies in the
S&P 100 Index, which measures the performance of one hundred
major companies in the United States across diverse industry
groups," include information about social and environmental
business practices on their Web sites.2 5 Moreover, 40% of those same
companies issue special "corporate social responsibility (CSR)
reports" upon which investors and consumers in the SRI community
rely.26 Because companies suffer negative market consequences
when reports come to light regarding harmful social, labor, or
environmental practices, 21 some corporations have begun working
together with SRI funds and shareholder advocacy groups to build
into their business plans specific policies responsive to the SRI
community. 28
Regardless of whether corporations actually embrace a cooperative posture in striving to achieve the goals of the SRI community,
corporations increasingly heed the market's demand for disclosures
24. For a description of the S&P 100 Index, see Indices, http://www2.standardand
poors.com/servlettSatelite?pagename=sp/Page/IndicesIndexg&r=l&I=EN&b=4&s=6&ig=
48&i=140&xcd=GBL100 (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
25. Press Release, Soc. Inv. Research Analysts Network, Socially Responsible Investment
Analysts Find More Large U.S. Companies Reporting on Social and Environmental Issues
(July 11, 2005), availableathttp'J/www.socialinvest.org/areas/news/SP100benchmarkingl. pdf.
26. Id.
27. For example, Domini Investments, a bellwether SRI fund, dropped Wal-Mart from its
socially responsible index fund, the Domini 400, based on reports about poor labor and human
rights conditions involving its overseas suppliers. See Ellen Braunstein, From Sweatshops to
Shopping Malls, RETAIL TRAFFIC, Sept. 1, 2001, availableat http://retailtrafficmag.commag/
retail-hotjopicsweatshops/index.html (describing Domini's decision based on "a report from
the National Labor Committee that Wal-Mart goods were made by nearly enslaved workers
under armed guard in Honduras and China. Wal-Mart's 'Kathie Lee' goods were made by 13year-olds in Honduras, forced to work 13 hours a day, the report states").
28. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosionof
the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 528-29 (2005);
Matthew Hirschland, Whose Responsibility? CSR, Business and Public Policy: Why Going It
Alone Is Not an Option, LEADING PERSP., Winter 2006, at 1, available at http://www.
bsr.org/CSRResources/LeadingPerspectives/2006/2006_Winter.pdf; Stacey Smith, Navigating
the Stakeholder Relations Continuum, LEADING PERSP., Fall 2004, at 6, availableat http://
www.bsr.org/CSRResources/LeadingPerspectives/2004/Fall.pdf.
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regarding business practices and operations relevant to socially
responsible investing.2" As a recent PricewaterhouseCoopers study
indicated, many large U.S. companies consider their stance on labor,
environmental, and social practices to be "the next competitive
battlefield."3 ° Engaging on the battlefield requires corporations to
speak on a variety of social, political, ethical, and environmental
matters. And to the extent the First Amendment fully protects those
inherently political disclosures, their accuracy becomes impossible
to test. That inability to challenge the truth of politically tinged
corporate speech seriously threatens the basic viability of socially
responsible investing.
C. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky
The case of Nike, Inc. v. Kasky reveals the imminence of the
collision between commercial and political speech, even though the
Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case without reaching the
underlying merits.3 1 The case involved a suit brought by a private
citizen, Marc Kasky, under a California consumer fraud statute that
prohibited "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising."3 2
Kasky claimed that Nike repeatedly made false or misleading
statements to the press about its overseas labor practices, in
violation of the statute. Nike's public defense of its labor practices
was prompted by concerns about the negative impact that recent
newspaper and television stories regarding its labor practices were
having on Nike stockholders and consumers.3 3 Stating in 1998 that
"the American consumer doesn't want to buy products made under
abusive conditions," 4 Nike's CEO, Phil Knight, partially blamed the
29. For a detailed discussion of the link between social investment and corporate
accountability, see Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1293-306 (1999).
30. Clinton Wilder, The Next Competitive Battlefield-The Sustainability Movement's
'Triple Bottom Line'Requires IT Execs To Deliver Better Data, OPrvIIZE, Aug. 1, 2002, at 76
(internal quotation marks omitted).
31. 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003) (per curiam).
32. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2000).
33. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Landmark Free-Speech Case That Wasn't:
The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 965, 974-76 (2004).
34. Bill Richards, Nike To Increase Minimum Age in Asia for New Hirings, Improve Air
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company's lackluster financial performance over the prior two years
on public concerns about Nike's labor practices." Nonetheless, in
the context of its Supreme Court challenge to the consumer fraud
statute, Nike claimed that because its statements to the press
touched on matters of public concern, those comments deserved full
protection under the First Amendment. 6
So how does Nike bring to light the jurisprudential problems the
Court will inevitably have to face? When laws place civil or criminal
penalties on certain instances of commercial speech, companies have
a strong incentive to escape the ambit of those regulations by
claiming political protection under the First Amendment. In Nike,
a consumer protection statute fueled the contest. But corporate
speech restrictions appear in other areas of the law as well. Most
notably, the securities laws regulate corporate speech in myriad
ways using a variety of different standards for liability.3 7 Moreover,
the degree of regulation in the consumer protection setting pales in
comparison to the rigid speech regulation under the securities
laws. So if companies like Nike can use the First Amendment to
evade civil or criminal penalties for fraudulent or misleading
speech, compliance with the securities laws will seem unnecessary,
at least when corporate speech touches some matter of public
concern.
Given the amount of resources and effort companies expend
complying with the securities laws in offering securities, making
quarterly or annual reports, soliciting shareholder proxies, and in
a host of other corporate contexts, 39 a strong incentive may exist to
link corporate disclosures with enough political sentiment to render
Quality, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1998, at B10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. See Letter from Philip H. Knight, Chairman of the Bd. & Chief Executive Officer,
Nike, Inc., to the Shareholders (1998), available at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.
jhtml?page=17 (select "Fiscal year 1998 annual report" hyperlink under "Annual Reports";
then select "Letter to Shareholders" hyperlink) (attributing disappointing financial results to
"Asia ... brown shoes ... labor practices ... resignations ... layoffs ... [and] boring ads" (ellipses
in original)).
36. See Brief for Petitioners at 43, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575)
(arguing that statements about company practices that touch some issue of public concern
must be protected unless made with "actual malice").
37. See infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 180-87.
39. Paul Rose, BalancingPublicMarket Benefits andBurdens for Smaller CompaniesPost
Sarbanes-Oxley, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 707, 714-15 (2005).
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the amalgam fully protected under the First Amendment. Current
First Amendment jurisprudence, however, provides no clear
guidelines regarding the boundaries between commercial and
corporate political speech. That the Supreme Court was willing to
take the case lends continuing credibility to the claim that, under
existing First Amendment jurisprudence, politically tinged commercial speech deserves robust protection. To the extent corporations
like Nike are able to collapse the distinction between commercial
and political speech, then, the continuing viability of the securities
regulation regime gets cast into doubt.

II. THE LIMITATIONS OF FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY
Fully understanding why current First Amendment jurisprudence
remains incapable of ensuring the integrity of the U.S. capital
markets requires an examination of the disparate principles and
standards governing corporate political speech and commercial
speech. The current jurisprudential rift seems to originate less
from fidelity to any fundamental philosophical commitments at the
outset than from an organic, perhaps imperfect, evolution of legal
standards over time.4" That courts refine legal principles and
standards upon consideration of new cases should cause neither
surprise nor alarm. To the contrary, that process represents the
great hallmark of the common law method itself.4 1 What remains
especially notable-and increasingly problematic-in the case of
corporate speech is that the controlling legal standards did not
evolve along a single path. Instead, a split occurred in corporate
speech jurisprudence. Although a detailed examination of the
historical causes of that doctrinal divide lies well outside the scope
of this Article, a brief description of the evolution of the current
standards governing commercial speech and corporate political
speech helps establish that, in the realm of corporate speech, a
40. See, e.g., Susan L. Ross, Note, Corporate Speech on Political Issues: The First
Amendment in Conflict with Democratic Ideals?, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 445, 447-54 (describing
the historical divergence of commercial and political speech standards).
41. See, e.g., Ernest Bruncken, The Common Law and Statutes, 29 YALE L.J. 516, 522
(1920); Carl F. Stychin, The Commentaries of ChancellorJames Kent and the Development of
an American Common Law, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 440, 446-51 (1993). But see generally
Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 253 (1980).
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jurisprudential fork indeed developed. And with its tines currently
pointed in opposite directions, that fork has become an increasingly
frustrating legal tool for resolving new speech claims.
A. Commercial Speech Doctrine
The commercial speech doctrine first emerged during World
War II in Valentine v. Chrestensen,4 a case that rather presciently
anticipated the current jurisprudential problem. In Chrestensen,an
owner of a decommissioned U.S. naval submarine who wanted to
use leaflets to solicit paying customers challenged a New York City
sanitary code prohibition on the distribution of commercial handbills.4 3 Perhaps too cleverly, the plaintiff attempted to evade the
ordinance by distributing double-sided leaflets containing a
commercial advertisement for the submarine on the front and a
political protest of another local ordinance on the back.4 4 While the
context related to sanitation rather than securities regulation, the
case provides a strikingly early example of an effort to insulate
commercial speech from regulation by creating an amalgam of
commercial and political commentary.
Despite the rather sophisticated strategy employed by the
plaintiff-a strategy since reinvigorated by modern corporations like
Nike-the Court resolved any potential tension between commercial
and political speech rights simply by ignoring the latter. In an
extremely brief opinion, the Court announced that while limitations
certainly exist on the ability to regulate speech in certain public
fora, "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising."45 The Court cursorily
rejected plaintiff s contention that he was engaged in disseminating
public commentary "inextricably attached" 4' 6 to commercial advertising by stating, "[i]f that evasion were successful, every merchant
who desires to broadcast advertising leaflets in the streets need only
append a civic appeal, or a moral platitude, to achieve immunity
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

316 U.S. 52 (1942).
Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 55.
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from the law's command."4 7 The Court thus embraced a pragmatic
justification for the outcome without engaging the difficult jurisprudential issues raised regarding the precise nature of commercial
and political speech. Although the Court's scant analysis has faced
significant criticism," the case nonetheless provides the historical
foundation for affording commercial speech limited constitutional
protection and an early glimpse at the jurisprudential challenges
posed when commercial and political speech are mixed together.
Many decades later, the Supreme Court significantly changed
course and articulated much broader constitutional protection for
commercial speech in VirginiaState Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council,Inc.49 The case involved a Virginia statute prohibiting the publication or advertisement of prescription
drug prices. Abandoning the bald statement in Chrestensen that
the Constitution places no limits on the regulation of commercial
speech,5" the Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection
even to speech that does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction."'" Justifying constitutional protection from the listener's perspective, the Court stated that the public has an interest
in the "free flow of commercial information" that may be "keener by
far" than any interest in "the day's most urgent political debate."5 2
Although striking down the regulation, the Court indicated that
commercial speech still faced greater regulation than noncommercial speech. Switching from the listener's perspective to an assessment of the speaker's interests, the Court suggested that deceptive
or false commercial speech could still face legitimate regulation
because the truthfulness of commercial speech was more easily
verifiable by the speaker than political speech, and the overarching
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of CommercialSpeech?, 76 VA.
L. REv. 627, 628 (1990) (describing the Court's failure to discuss the First Amendment's
underlying purposes and values to support its decision that commercial speech deserved no
constitutional protection).
49. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
50. Id. at 776; see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,820 n.6 (1975) (discussing Justice
Douglas's reflections on the analysis in Chrestensen as "casual," "offhand," and unable to
survive later scrutiny).
51. Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
52. Id. at 763.
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need for businesses to advertise would counteract any potential
chilling effect that speech regulations might ordinarily entail.5 3
The Court's assessment of the speaker's and listener's interests
arguably justifies subjecting commercial speech to
greater regulation. What the Court failed to provide, however, was any meaningful
method for distinguishing commercial from noncommercial or
political speech.
Soon after Virginia State Board,the Supreme Court articulated
the modern test for commercial speech protection in CentralHudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.5 4 In striking
down a regulation banning all advertising by a utility company,
the Court adopted a four-part test to determine when the First
Amendment protects commercial speech. As a threshold matter, in
order to receive any constitutional protection the commercial
speech must relate to lawful activity and not be misleading.55
Second, a substantial governmental interest must support the
speech regulation.5 6 Third, the regulation must directly advance
that substantial governmental interest.57 Finally, the regulation
must not be "more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." As the Court stated, the Constitution affords "a lesser
protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally
guaranteed expression."5 9 Moving away from the tone, if not the
substance, of the broad comment in Virginia State Board that the
public's interest in commercial information might be "keener by
far"6 than any interest in current political debates, the Court stated
that only the "informational function of advertising" required
constitutional protection.61 Moreover, while citing Virginia State
Board,the Court adopted a seemingly broader definition of commercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests of

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
(1976).
61.

Id. at 772 n.24.
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 563.
Va. State Bd.of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64.
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the speaker and its audience."6 2 Despite the apparently increasing
reach of what commercial speech entailed, the definition of commercial speech itself remained vague. Nonetheless, the analytical
framework provided by the Court presented a level of intermediate
scrutiny for commercial speech6 3 occupying a jurisprudential rung
below the strict scrutiny afforded political speech and other types of
noncommercial expression.6 4
Application of the Central Hudson test, however, has produced
rather inconsistent levels of protection for commercial speech and
a lack of confidence in the Central Hudson framework itself.6 5 Of
course, an intermediate scrutiny test is not necessarily unworkable.6 6 But the Central Hudson test has at times permitted
significant commercial speech regulation, while at other times
allowed broad commercial speech rights, even when significant
governmental interests were at stake.6 7
For instance, with the Central Hudson pendulum swinging
toward greater protection for commercial speech, the Court struck
down a prohibition on advertising liquor prices in 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island.6 8 Although the Justices' opinions varied, a
majority called into question the continuing validity of the distinc-

62. Id. at 561.
63. See Neil M. Richards, Reconciling DataPrivacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 1149, 1178-79 (2005); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoringand
TranscendingStrict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2450-51 (1996).
64. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding that a regulation
prohibiting solicitors to be within 100 feet of entrances to polling places is subject to strict
scrutiny); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (holding that a regulation of political speech
displayed near foreign embassies must be subjected to strict scrutiny).
65. For general criticism of the vagueness of the Central Hudson framework, see generally
Robert Post, The ConstitutionalStatus of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000). See
also Kozinski & Banner, supra note 48, at 630-31 (criticizing the lack of a principled
framework to understand or apply Central Hudson); Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A
Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1639, 1645 (1993) (describing the test's vagueness and
the difficulty in ensuring its consistent application).
66. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 & n.9 (1982); Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1976). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court,
1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 61-65
(1992); Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial
Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298 (1998).
67. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 48, at 630.
68. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
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tion between commercial and noncommercial speech embraced by
CentralHudson.69 In a later case, Lorrilard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,7"
the Court struck down certain restrictions on tobacco sales within
a close proximity to schools and playgrounds. Although acknowledging the strong governmental interest in curtailing underage tobacco
use, the Court found the fit between the precise regulations at issue
and the state interest insufficiently tight.7
Revealing how murky CentralHudson becomes in the context of
politically tinged commercial speech, the Court held unconstitutional a federal statute prohibiting unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. 2 The
Court found that the pamphlets at issue, which described how the
drug manufacturer's condoms prevented unwanted pregnancies and
venereal disease, contained "discussions of important public
issues"73 and could not be "characterized merely as proposals to
engage in commercial transactions."74 Moreover, the Court noted
that even though the drug company had an "economic motivation for
mailing the pamphlets," 5 which referred to a "specific product"76
and were "conceded to be advertisements,"7 7 none of those factors
established the speech was commercial rather than political.
Without any principled definition of commercial or political speech
to guide the analysis, however, the Court simply announced that the
69. See id. at 502 (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.) ("The special
dangers that attend complete bans on truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech cannot be
explained away by appeals to the 'commonsense distinctions' that exist between commercial
and noncommercial speech. Regulations that suppress the truth are no less troubling because
they target objectively verifiable information, nor are they less effective because they aim at
durable messages. As a result, neither the 'greater objectivity' nor the 'greater hardiness' of
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech justifies reviewing its complete suppression with
added deference." (citation omitted)); see also id. at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I do not see
a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 'commercial' speech is 'of lower value'
than 'noncommercial' speech."); id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment)
("I share Justice Thomas's discomfort with the Central Hudson test, which seems to me to
have nothing more than policy intuition to support it.").
70. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
71. Id. at 564-66.
72. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
73. Id. at 67-68.
74. Id. at 66.
75. Id. at 67.
76. Id. at 66.
77. Id.
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"combination of all these characteristics" 8 rendered the pamphlets
commercial speech. While the commercial speech label made the
pamphlets more amenable to regulation, the Court nonetheless
struck down the statute, concluding it was not narrowly tailored to
the otherwise substantial governmental interest in promoting
parental counseling on birth control issues.79
With the Central Hudson pendulum swinging toward greater
regulation of commercial speech, the Court upheld a ban on
advertisements for casino gambling in Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co."° Applying the four-part commercial
speech test, the Court found that the state had a significant interest
in curtailing gambling among residents of Puerto Rico and that the
regulation was sufficiently tailored to the state interest.8 ' In stark
contrast to Lorrilard,the Court found a sufficiently tight fit between
the state interest and the regulation, even though the statute
applied only to casino gambling.
Similarly favoring commercial speech regulation, the Court
upheld a statute barring private companies from selling products on
a state college campus in Board of Trustees of the State University
of New York v. Fox,8 3 a case considering whether students could hold
'Tupperware parties" in their dormitories. Harkening back to the
strategy in Chrestensen,4 the plaintiffs argued that, as part of the
Tupperware party, lessons in home economics were inextricably
intertwined with the commercial sales pitch. 5 The Tupperware
party, however, seemed to lack any of the political commentary at
stake in Chrestensen."6 Perhaps as a result, the Court summarily
rejected the notion that the Tupperware party contained an
amalgam of commercial and noncommercial speech deserving full
First Amendment protection.87 Moreover, explicitly rejecting the
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 67 (emphasis in the original).
Id. at 72-75.
478 U.S. 328 (1986).
Id. at 341-42.
Id.
492 U.S. 469, 471-73, 485-86 (1989).
See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
Fox, 492 U.S. at 474-75.
See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
As Justice Scalia stated in the majority opinion:
No law of man or of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without
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notion that Central Hudson required the same strict scrutiny
afforded regulations of political speech,' the Court held that the
restrictions on commercial speech need not be the least restrictive
available.8 9 Acknowledging the potential vagueness of the guidance
provided, the Court stated that "we take account of the difficulty of
establishing with precision the point at which restrictions become
more extensive than their objective requires, and provide the
Legislative and Executive Branches needed leeway in a field
(commercial speech) 'traditionally subject to governmental regulation."' 90 With that leeway, the Court upheld the commercial speech
restriction.
The description of how the commercial speech doctrine has
evolved provides an important context for understanding the
contrast between the treatment of commercial speech and corporate
political speech. Certainly for many scholars, the variance in
outcomes under the Central Hudson test seems ad hoc, lacking a
consistent speech principle or unifying definition of commercial
speech to support the decisions as a group. 91 The very existence of
the commercial speech doctrine, however, requires separating
commercial messages from political expression in the eyes of the
First Amendment. When the line between the commercial and
political thus becomes blurred, any frustration with a lack of clarity
in the commercial speech doctrine becomes compounded by a new
set of potentially relevant standards governing corporate political
speech.

teaching home economics, or to teach home economics without selling
housewares. Nothing in the resolution prevents the speaker from conveying, or
the audience from hearing, these noncommercial messages, and nothing in the
nature of things requires them to be combined with commercial messages.
Fox, 492 U.S. at 474.
88. See id. at 478 ("W]e think it would be incompatible with the asserted 'subordinate
position [of commercial speech] in the scale of First Amendment values' to apply a more rigid
standard in the present context." (second alteration in original)).
89. Id. at 480.
90. Id. at 480-81 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)).
91. See, e.g., Kozinski & Volokh, supra note 65 and accompanying text; Post, supra note
65 and accompanying text.
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B. CorporatePoliticalSpeech
An examination of the evolving standards governing corporate
political speech reveals that, while political speech generally
receives the most ardent protection under the First Amendment, the
protection afforded corporate political speech varies depending on
the context. At its core, the First Amendment serves to protect free
political deliberation and commentary." As a result,any regulations
affecting political speech receive strict scrutiny, rarely surviving
judicial review." In the realm of corporate political speech, however,
the level of protection seems to vary depending on whether the
speech occurs in the context of an impending election. Although
outside the electoral environment the First Amendment deems
irrelevant the speaker's identity as a corporation or a person, within
the context of an upcoming election, the political speech of corporations may be subject to greater regulation than other political
speakers.
At least outside the special context of an impending election,
corporations arguably enjoy broad political speech rights. In First
NationalBank of Boston v. Bellotti,s" the Supreme Court invalidated
a Massachusetts criminal statute that prohibited a corporation from
92. See, e.g., First Natl Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978) ('[IThere
is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."' (second alteration in original) (quoting
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
269 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people" (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))); see also Charles W. Collier,
CulturalCritique and Legal Change, 43 FLA. L. REV. 463, 472-73 (1991) (describing how the
Supreme Court embraced "highly speech-protective principles" in the context of political
speech); Greg Lisby, PressRights and Laws, in AMERICAN JOURNALISM: HISTORY, PRINCIPLES,
PRACTICES 135-36 (W. David Sloan & Lisa Mullikin Parcell eds., 2002) ('Thus, an
understanding of the history of press rights and laws in America is a recognition of the
delicate balance the Constitution attempts to preserve between public rights and private
rights, between openness and secrecy, between the tyranny of the majority and the tyranny
of the minority, between the free flow of information and the restrictions on that flow for
private profit."); Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP.CT.
REV. 245, 255-57 (asserting that the First Amendment primarily serves to protect political
deliberation and "governmental responsibility").
93. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[I]t
is the rare case in which we have held that a law survives strict scrutiny.").
94. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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making contributions to influence voter opinion on ballot issues
relating to matters outside the ambit of the business or assets of the
corporation. Noting a primary purpose of the First Amendment was
to protect discussion of governmental affairs, the Court stated that
"[i]t is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a
democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from
a corporation rather than an individual."9 5 Focusing squarely on
political debate's impact on the audience, the Court concluded that
"[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual."9 6 Citing that
precise language from Bellotti, in ConsolidatedEdison Co. v. Public
Service Commission the Court overturned a New York administrative order prohibiting public utility companies from including
inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy in customer
billing statements.9 7
Just a few years later, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission,9" the Court again refused to embrace a
permissive standard for regulating corporate political speech and
held unconstitutional a state commission's order requiring public
utilities to include third-party newsletters along with the monthly
bills sent to customers. With the value of political speech to the
audience rather than to the speaker at the forefront of the analysis,
the Court reasoned that "[t]he identity of the speaker is not decisive
in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other
associations, like individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate,
and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First
Amendment seeks to foster."99 At least in the context of nonelectoral
political speech, then, corporations seem entitled to the same speech
rights as other political speakers.
Despite the parity in First Amendment protection afforded
political speakers outside the electoral context, corporate political
speech faces much greater susceptibility to regulation once an
95. Id. at 777 (footnote omitted).

96. Id.
97. 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980).
98. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
99. Id. at 8 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783).
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election for office is at stake. Although a great number of cases
spanning many decades address limitations on corporate political
activity in the electoral context, 1' ° surveying just a few provides a
sufficient point for contrast. Much of the distinction in recent
years flows from the Supreme Court's consideration in Buckley v.
Valeo"'0 of campaign restrictions contained in the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). 1 2 The restrictions, which limited
campaign contributions to $1000 by any person or corporation, were
upheld by the Court after it interpreted the limitation to apply to
instances of "express advocacy" that mentioned a clearly identified
candidate in an upcoming election.' °3
The basic holding of Buckley was upheld in Federal Election
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,"°4 a case
involving a subsequent amendment to FECA that prohibited
corporations from using general treasury funds to make contributions towards express advocacy in the context of an election. With
respect to nonprofit institutions, the Court held the regulation
unconstitutional. 0 5 Nonetheless, the Court embraced the principles
underlying FECA's limitation on the electoral speech rights of
corporations, citing a host of ills it had recently recognized result
from excessive corporate spending and the corrosive control of
corporations over the electoral process. 1°'
100. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152 (2003).
101. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
102. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442
(2000)).
103. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48, 58-59.
104. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
105. Id. at 263-64.
106. The Court remarked:
We have described that rationale in recent opinions as the need to restrict
"the influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate form," to
"eliminate the effect of aggregated wealth on federal elections," to curb the
political influence of "those who exercise control over large aggregations of
capital," and to regulate the "substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the
special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization."
This concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth
reflects the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity of the
marketplace of political ideas is important. It acknowledges the wisdom of
Justice Holmes' observation that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market ....
"
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Curtailing the special status of nonprofits, the Court limited the
application of Massachusetts Citizens in Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce. °7 In that case, the Court rejected a challenge to a Michigan statute prohibiting corporations from using
corporate treasury funds for independent expenditures supporting
or opposing candidates in elections for state office. Although the
Chamber of Commerce was a nonprofit entity, the Court distinguished the purely political purposes of the nonprofit entity in
Massachusetts Citizens with the Chamber of Commerce, which
engaged in political and nonpolitical activities. °8 As a result, the
Court upheld the regulation, supported by similar strong references
to the deleterious effects of excessive corporate influence over the
electoral process.'0 9 As in earlier cases, of great importance to the
Court was the ability to amass wealth that arguably garners
corporations an unfair advantage in public debates."0

Direct corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that
resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an
unfair advantage in the political marketplace.
Id. at 257 (ellipsis in original) (citations and footnote omitted).
.107. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
108. Id. at 661-65.
109. The Court stated that
corporations are "by far the most prominent example of entities that enjoy legal
advantages enhancing their ability to accumulate wealth." The desire to
counterbalance those advantages unique to the corporate form is the State's
compelling interest in this case; thus, excluding from the statute's coverage
unincorporated entities that also have the capacity to accumulate wealth "does
not undermine its justification for regulating corporations."
Id. at 665 (citations omitted). In analyzing the application of the First Amendment to the
Fourteenth Amendment claims preserved, the Court stated, "The State's decision to regulate
only corporations is precisely tailored to serve the compelling state interest of eliminating
from the political process the corrosive effect of political 'war chests' amassed with the aid of
the legal advantages given to corporations." Id. at 666.
110. The Court wrote that
[s]tate law grants corporations special advantages--such as limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of
assets-that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources
in ways that maximize the return on their shareholders' investments. These
state-created advantages not only allow corporations to play a dominant role in
the Nation's economy, but also permit them to use "resources amassed in the
economic marketplace" to obtain "an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace."
Id. at 658-59 (quoting Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 257).
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In a pair of very recent cases, the Supreme Court continued to
uphold the regulation of corporate political activity within the
electoral context. In Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont"'
the Court rejected a challenge to regulations under FECA that
barred direct corporate campaign contributions to a nonprofit advocacy corporation in the context of federal elections. Emphasizing
the long line of cases supporting regulation of corporate electoral
speech, the Court rather boldly stated that "[a]ny attack on the
federal prohibition of direct corporate political contributions goes
against the current of a century of congressional efforts to curb
corporations' potentially 'deleterious influences on federal elections,'
which we have canvassed a number of times before.""' 2 Most
recently, in McConnell v. FEC,"' the Court upheld a federal regulation effectively barring a corporation from using treasury funds to
produce advertisements that merely mention a candidate's name
within sixty days of an election.' 14 In an extremely lengthy opinion,
the Court accepted the compelling state interest in regulating the
corporate political speech at issue, stating that "[w]e have repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at 'the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas.""' 5
Thus, although the First Amendment provides significant
protection for corporate political speech well before election day,
that protection all but evaporates as election day draws near. In
certain circumstances, the Court embraces normative justifications
for a robust deliberative process that includes corporate speakers.
In other situations the Court relies on different speech principles to
protect that same deliberative process from excessive corporate
influence. The point of making the contrast between the speech
rights corporations enjoy inside and outside the electoral context is
111. 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
112. Id. at 152 (quoting United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957)).
113. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
114. Id. at 204-05; see Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91-92 (2002) (codified at 2
U.S.C. § 441b).
115. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 660 (1990)).
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not to identify some glaring defect in the Court's logic in selecting
among competing speech norms to protect or restrict corporate
speech."6 Instead, the contrast reveals that the political speech
rights of corporations necessarily vary depending on which of the
conflicting underlying speech principles the Court chooses to use as
a guide.
The Supreme Court's failure to articulate any clear definition of
political speech itself, however, remains even more problematic.
Although one may demarcate intelligibly the outer boundary of an
election cycle, that ability provides little help in determining
whether the Court's political speech jurisprudence should even
be the relevant framework for assessing the constitutionality of
any instance of corporate speech. Absent clear definitions of what
constitutes commercial and political speech, predicting which
particular jurisprudential approach should govern the speech
rights corporations enjoy becomes all but impossible. The unpredictability created by that definitional gap lies at the very heart of
the potential threat to the securities regulation regime and the
continued integrity of the U.S. capital markets.
C. Securities Regulation Adrift
The securities regulation regime currently inhabits an island of
immunity from the First Amendment. That respite from constitutional scrutiny might seem especially odd considering securities
regulation primarily involves restrictions on speech. 7 After all, not
only do the securities laws and the rules promulgated by the SEC
both compel and prohibit corporate speech,"' but they regulate the
116. For other viewpoints suggesting such a defect exists, see Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v.
Kasky and the Running-But-Going-NowhereCommercialSpeech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & POL'Y

383 (2005); David S. Welkowitz & Tyler T. Ochoa, The Terminatoras Eraser: How Arnold
Schwarzenegger Used the Right of Publicity To Terminate Non-DefamatoryPoliticalSpeech,
45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 651 (2005).
117. See Roberta S. Karmel, The FirstAmendment and Government Regulationof Economic
Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 1 (1989) ("Securities regulation is essentially the regulation of
speech."); Schauer, supranote 9, at 1778 ("It might be hyperbole to describe the Securities and
Exchange Commission as the Content Regulation Commission, but such a description would
not be wholly inaccurate.").
118. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000) (prohibiting "gun jumping'); 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000); 15
U.S.C. § 78n (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006) (prohibiting fraudulent omissions or
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content, form, and scope of corporate communications as well." 9
Whether in the context of the sale of securities, annual and
quarterly reporting, proxy solicitation, representations by investment advisers, or prohibitions on fraud and insider trading, the
securities laws attempt to maintain confidence in the capital
markets through a complex web of corporate speech restrictions and
disclosure requirements. 20 Although the U.S. securities laws do not
currently face any serious constitutional challenges, the Court has
not yet offered any principled justification for excluding those
heavy-handed speech regulations from the First Amendment's
protective reach. As a result, no clear theoretical anchor supports
the continued viability of the U.S. securities regulation regime.' 2 '
Constitutionally adrift, the network of securities laws remains
especially vulnerable as new corporate speech claims arise.
So how does the Supreme Court apply its existing commercial
speech and corporate political speech principles in the realm of
securities regulation? Quite simply, the Supreme Court has never
squarely addressed that task. At most, the Court has made
occasional-and frustratingly oblique-references to the special
nature of the securities markets that permits substantial governmental regulation.
For instance, in Lowe v. SEC,'22 the Court considered whether the
SEC could enjoin the publication of an investment newsletter under
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.123 Because the publisher was
not registered as an investment adviser under the statute and did
statements in connection with the sale of securities); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2006) (barring
fraud in the proxy solicitation context); see also Schauer, supranote 9, at 1779-80 (discussing
restrictions on registration and proxy regulation); R. Polk Wagner, Essay, Filtersand the First
Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REv. 755, 780-81 (1999) (noting that certain disclosures are
mandatory under securities laws).
119. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103 (2006); see also THOMAS
LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.3 (5th ed. 2005) (providing an overview
of various regulations that control the content, form, and manner of corporate disclosures).
120. See generally George J. Benston, Government Constraintson Political,Artistic, and
CommercialSpeech, 20 CONN. L. REv. 303,317-24 (1988) (detailing numerous areas of speech
regulation under the securities laws); Nicholas Wolfson, The FirstAmendment and the SEC,
20 CONN. L. REv. 265,277-99 (1988) (describing various contexts in which securities regulation
restricts or compels speech).
121. See Schauer, supra note 9, at 1777-82.
122. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(D) (Supp. 2005).
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not otherwise qualify for an exemption, the SEC enjoined dissemination of the newsletter. 124 Although originally granting certiorari
to consider whether the SEC's prior restraint on speech violated the
First Amendment, the Court parsed the statute's language to afford
an exemption to the publisher.12 Using basic tools of statutory
construction to decide the case, the Court ultimately chose not to
consider any First Amendment issue.126
Moving from avoidance to obfuscation, the Court has nonetheless
provided momentary glimpses of the role speech rights play in the
securities realm, albeit in cases that did not even involve any
securities regulation issue. For example, in ParisAdult Theatre I v.
Slaton,127 a famous pornography case involving the display of
obscene movies in places of public accommodation, the Supreme
Court gave a brief nod to government regulation of securities. In a
part of the opinion disparaging unfettered personal liberty as the
guiding light of free speech jurisprudence, the Court stated "that
neither the First Amendment nor 'free will' precludes States from
having 'blue sky' laws to regulate what sellers of securities may
write or publish about their wares. Such laws are to protect the
weak, the uninformed, the unsuspecting, and the gullible from the
exercise of their own volition.' ' 28 Although the original constitutional challenges to the state securities laws in the early part of the
twentieth century did not even involve speech claims, 29 the Court
nonetheless seemed to invest its prior decisions upholding the
validity of state securities regulations with an extra layer of
protection from the First Amendment.

124. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 184.

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 210-11.
Id.
413 U.S. 49 (1973).
Id. at 64 (citation omitted). "Blue sky" laws are state statutes that regulate securities.

See STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES COUNSELING FOR NEW AND DEVELOPING COMPANIES § 1:2

(2005).
129. See, e.g., Merrick v. N.W.Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 569-70 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux
Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 560-61 (1917); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539
(1917) (each challenging a state securities law under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Commerce Clause); see also COHN, supranote 128, § 1:2 (discussing the early constitutional
challenges to state "blue sky" laws).
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A few years later, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 130 the
Supreme Court affirmed the indefinite suspension of a lawyer who
personally solicited accident victims in violation of state disciplinary
rules. Discussing the First Amendment's application to the lawyer's
commercial solicitation, the Court stated in dicta that
[niumerous examples could be cited of communications that are
regulated without offending the First Amendment, such as the
exchange of information about securities, [and] corporate proxy
statements ....
Each of these examples illustrates that the State
does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed
harmful to the public whenever speech is a component of the
activity.131
Although the Court obviously intended to provide only anecdotal
examples of where the First Amendment cannot reach, whether
proxy statements and securities sales stand as sufficient surrogates
for the myriad other contexts in which the securities laws regulate
corporate speech remains wholly unclear.
Finally, in Dun & Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., a
case involving a defamation action against a credit reporting
agency that issued false credit reports, the Court cited Ohralik for
the general proposition that certain types of speech fall outside
3 2 Hinting
the First Amendment's protective umbrella."
that its
prior pronouncement regarding the broad ability of government to
regulate securities sales and proxy statements was based on the
commercial nature of the speech involved, the Court stated that
"similar regulation of political speech is subject to the most rigorous
scrutiny.1 33 Of course, the difficulty in distinguishing between
commercial and political speech provides the crux of the problem in
the securities regulation realm as corporations begin to entangle
corporate disclosures with political commentary. If the securities
laws remain insulated from First Amendment challenges based on
an assumption that the regulated speech involves no political
130. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
131. Id. at 456 (citations omitted).
132. 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1985).
133. Id.; see also SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(explicitly adopting the proposition in Dun & Bradstreetexempting securities regulation from
constitutional scrutiny).
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component, constitutional review of such regulations seems more
likely as that assumption becomes empirically suspect.
Despite the extraordinary brevity of the comments about speech
rights and securities regulation in ParisAdult Theatre, Ohralik,and
Dun & Bradstreet,the need to protect the public from harm provides
some unifying thread. Recognizing that common theme might seem
at odds with the basic critique that the securities regulation regime
remains constitutionally adrift and intellectually disconnected from
the First Amendment. While linking the ability to regulate speech
to public harm provides a clear philosophical platform upon which
to begin building a coherent system of speech rights, the unadorned
commentary by the Court provides little insight regarding the
ultimate shape those rights might take in the securities regulation
context. What level of public harm must exist for the government to
regulate corporate speech? Does minimal threat of harm justify
extraordinary regulation? Does fraud provide the relevant metric?
If so, should common law fraud principles supplant the vast system
of statutes, rules, and regulations that constitute the modern
securities regulation regime? Must courts balance public harms
against the political speech rights of corporations? At what point do
political viewpoints become fraudulent? To those questions, the
Court offers no answers. Instead, the Court simply leaves the brief
and blunt impression that some unidentified, potential public harms
involving the sale of securities and corporate proxies effectively
insulate those areas of securities regulation from challenge under
the First Amendment.
Thus, the Supreme Court has occasionally proclaimed, absent
much explanation, that the securities markets remain subject
to government regulation without interference from the First
Amendment. The lack of any principled grounds for such a constitutional exemption, however, makes the continuing validity of that
proclamation itself somewhat suspect. Perhaps if the Supreme
Court's existing jurisprudence regarding commercial speech and
corporate political speech were clear, a challenge to the basic constitutionality of the securities laws would seem wholly unfounded. But
when, as now, the commercial speech doctrine and the Court's
approach to corporate political speech are bound to collide, a
constitutional battle over some of the most basic components of the
securities regulation regime seems quite possible.
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III. A NEW INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
The project of this Article is simply to provide an intellectual "test
drive" for the institutional approach, not to provide a wholesale
34
recapitulation and defense of Frederick Schauer's theory.
Nonetheless, in order to understand whether an institutional
analysis of the First Amendment helps determine the proper scope
of speech rights within the securities regulation regime, a brief
explanation of the background and tenets of the theory seems
essential.
A. The Nature of the Problem
A fundamental descriptive failure in current speech theory
motivates the development of an institutional approach to the First
Amendment. According to Schauer, no single speech principle seems
capable of describing accurately the set of speech rights enjoyed
under the U.S. Constitution. Certain areas of speech regulation,
such as copyright, antitrust, and securities regulation, rarely
face constitutional challenges despite the rather severe speech
limitations those regulations sometimes entail." 5 In other speech
contexts, constitutional attacks regularly occur even when the
speech limitations are slight. Although normative speech theories
based on self-government, democratic deliberation, a search for
truth, tolerance, personal autonomy, self-expression, or a variety of
other principles may each provide a strong foundation upon which
to build a coherent system of expressive rights, none adequately
accounts for the particular shape the First Amendment has actually
taken." 6 Therefore, those speech norms do not provide sufficient
guidance for those trying to determine where new speech claims
might actually fit within an existing jurisprudential framework that
does not clearly embrace any particular speech principle.' 3 7

134. For general criticism of Schauer's theory, see Dale Carpenter, The Value of

Institutions and the Values of Free Speech, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1407 (2005).
135. Schauer, supranote 9, at 1766-67.
136. Id. at 1785-86.
137. Schauer, supranote 1, at 1273.
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In addition, as a result of failing to consider the role institutions
might play in defining speech rights, the loose mix of doctrines,
standards, and tests embedded in current First Amendment
jurisprudence has produced inconsistent and incoherent outcomes. 3 ' As Schauer asserts, "there may be a point at which First
Amendment doctrine's institutional agnosticism has a highly
distorting effect."' 3 9 For instance, a serious problem arises when the
Supreme Court's failure to demarcate the boundaries of an institutional press creates fewer rights of access and rights to withhold
confidentially obtained information than what might be found in
countries with a much less-developed respect for freedom of the
press. 140 The problem can also be too much speech protection, as in
instances where individuals who give instructions to commit mass
harms are afforded the same speech rights as individuals speaking
before live audiences.' As a general matter, when courts fail to
distinguish among speech that occurs over the Internet, on cable
television, in print media, and by telephone, "serious questions arise
as to whether courts have overlooked important historical, structural, economic, and cultural differences among the various
channels and institutions of communication." 42 Without attention
to context, then, the variety of speech principles, doctrines, and tests
that comprise First Amendment jurisprudence produce outcomes
seemingly at odds with the basic goals of free speech itself.
B. The Tenets of Schauer's Solution
In contrast to the failings of existing speech theory, an institutional approach might not only explain more clearly why the First
Amendment reaches some areas and not others, but it could offer a
valuable analytical tool for shaping the First Amendment's contours
as new claims and contexts arise. 43 And, according to Schauer,
while assessing institutional functions and their social importance
may present a difficult empirical challenge, casting a blind eye to
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 1270, 1278.
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1270-71.
Id. at 1271.
Id.
Schauer, supra note 9, at 1784-87.
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the role institutions
play will only further distort First Amendment
144
doctrine.
So what are the tenets of Schauer's institutional approach to the
First Amendment? The theory rests on a surprisingly simple
suggestion that courts should take institutions into account when
analyzing the proper scope of speech rights. 145 According to Schauer,
certain important institutions in society function in ways that
embrace or threaten fundamental values underlying the First
Amendment. 4 6 To the extent an institution plays an important role
in American society, the scope of speech rights within that institution should depend, at least in part, on an assessment of the link
between the speech and the institution itself.14 7 Conceived in that
way, an institutional approach takes heed of the institution's
importance to the First Amendment and diminishes the need to
defend instances of speech directly based on some underlying
speech principles.148 Rather than forcing a debate over which speech
principles should control the ultimate outcome of the inquiry, 149 the
institutional approach attempts simply to change the framework for
the inquiry itself. 5 °
Adopting that new analytical framework, then, might lead to
acceptance of greater speech rights in some institutional settings
and acquiescence to more stringent speech restrictions in others.
For instance, Schauer suggests that based on an institutional
approach, "we might imagine a First Amendment that less grudgingly accepted colleges and universities as appropriate areas for
highly (externally) unregulated inquiry."'' That justification would
be based on the institutional importance that universities play in
the acquisition of knowledge and the development of social life, as
well as on the role that academic freedom plays within the university.'5 2 In contrast, in the institutional setting of elections, greater
speech restrictions (in some circumstances) might be more readily
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Schauer, supranote 1, at 1273.
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1273-74.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1273 & n.87.
Id. at 1274.
Id.
Id. at 1274-75.
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defensible based on the role elections play in securing fairness and
equality in American society and the necessity of restricting some
instances of speech to secure those goals. 5 ' Thus, the institutional
approach remains less concerned with the level of speech protection
than with the kind of institutions
that deserve consideration under
54
the First Amendment.
Even if Schauer is right that First Amendment jurisprudence
must take institutions seriously, is there really such a current
antipathy towards an institutional approach? Put differently, do
courts really avoid taking institutions into account when determining the First Amendment's reach? According to Schauer, the answer
to both questions is yes. While some exceptions exist,'5 5 courts have
historically interpreted the First Amendment based on distinctions
among different types of speech rather than different kinds of
institutional settings.'56 Schauer links the current institutional
agnosticism to the mistaken perception that free speech is purely
an individual right.'5 7 Although First Amendment cases and
commentaries are replete with justifications for speech based on
social rather than personal values, the sensibility that speech is an
individual human right makes somewhat unseemly a discussion of
institutions as a primary locus of speech analysis.'58
It is important to note, however, that an institutional approach
does not intend to supplant current First Amendment jurisprudence.' 59 Quite to the contrary, the institutional approach provides
an added layer of analysis rather than an entirely new analytical
framework. At least initially, that additional analytical layer might
seem redundant or intellectually cumbersome. But an institutional
perspective perhaps adds value by encouraging courts to take a step
back from the hodgepodge of overlapping, somewhat conflicting, and
frequently vague speech theories, definitions, and tests, and to look
at the institutional context in which the speech occurs. In simple
terms, it asks courts to consider the importance of certain institu153. Id. at 1276.
154. Id. at 1277.
155. Id. at 1263 & n.43 (discussing the context-centered analysis the Supreme Court has
embraced for broadcasting and military speech).
156. Id. at 1263.
157. Id. at 1268.
158. Id. at 1268-69.
159. Id. at 1273 n.87.
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tions in American life and to assess the effects of enhancing or
restricting speech rights through the lens of those institutions. So,
in the context of securities regulation, before answering the question
of whether corporations should enjoy full First Amendment
protection for politically tinged commercial speech, the institutional
approach suggests looking at the importance of the securities
regulation regime itself and the effects that granting corporations
broad speech rights would have on the integrity of the capital
markets. That added perspective seems neither redundant nor
cumbersome. Instead, it may very well be essential to guide the
evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence along a path that pays
adequate fidelity to the realities of the society we actually inhabit.
Conceived in that way, an institutional approach to the First
Amendment does not attempt to build speech rights in a theoretical
vacuum divorced from the necessities and struggles of social,
economic, and political life. As a result, the existence of scattered
pockets of speech immune from the First Amendment's reach does
not present the theoretical anomalies that even the most gifted
jurisprudential gymnast has difficulty explaining. 6 0 But in addition
to providing greater descriptive clarity regarding the particular
shape our speech rights actually take in American society, the
institutional approach helps provide a useful framework for
answering difficult speech rights questions where traditional
normative speech theories conflict or simply fail to offer sufficient
guidance. Following the institutional approach, an analysis of the
proper reach of the First Amendment must not begin in the ether of
normative speech theory, but rather must initially set foot on the
ground where the institutions and individuals who inhabit them
interact.
Quite obviously, this brief articulation of the institutional
approach does not intend to provide a detailed defense of the theory
Schauer developed more elegantly in his own work. But to the
extent Schauer might be right in his belief that "it seems increasingly implausible to imagine that such institutionally defined
locations should play only a minimal role in the design of First
Amendment doctrine,"'' the project here remains one of applied
160. See Schauer, supra note 9, at 1769-74.
161. Schauer, supra note 1, at 1277.
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science. Applied to the institution of securities regulation, whether
an institutional approach sheds any light on how to respond to the
impending jurisprudential collision between the commercial speech
doctrine and the current standards governing corporate political
speech remains to be seen. If the theory resonates in that particular
application, the exercise perhaps not only helps answer the question
about the First Amendment's proper reach in the context of
securities regulation but might also provide some insights into the
usefulness of the institutional approach itself.
IV. SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

The institutional approach to the First Amendment involves a
two-step analysis to examine what speech rights corporations
should enjoy within the securities regulation regime. The first step
involves assessing the institutional importance of the securities
regulation regime. That assessment necessarily includes evaluating
the relationship between securities regulation and the values
underlying the First Amendment. The second step involves investigating the relationship between restrictions on corporate speech
and the institution of securities regulation. In particular, the
analysis will focus on the effects that granting full First Amendment
protection to politically tinged corporate speech would have on the
system of mandatory disclosure and reporting under existing
securities laws. Based on that two-step investigation, very strong
institutional arguments seem to exist for permitting extensive
regulation of corporate political speech in order to preserve the
integrity of the US. capital markets.
A. The InstitutionalImportanceof Securities Regulation
The securities regulation regime ranks among the most important
institutions in the United States.162 At the very heart of that
162. Of course, determining whether a set of practices or policies should be labeled an
"institution" may present a difficult threshold challenge. With respect to the securities
regulation regime, however, the labeling issue does not seem terribly problematic. The
detailed set of statutes, rules and regulations constituting the securities laws, along with the
long history of the Securities & Exchange Commission, make both the core and contours of
the securities regulation regime seem rather easily definable. That ease of definition arguably
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institutional importance lies the special role that securities play in
American life.' 3 In addition to representing the basic instruments
of economic ownership of corporations, securities provide the right
to control corporations as well. Those economic and control rights
attached to securities seem especially significant, considering that
corporations own the vast majority of the assets and means of
production that drive the American economy.' Moreover, on a large
scale, governments and businesses alike use securities to raise
capital for building new facilities, expanding production, developing
communities, or undertaking massive public projects.'6 5 On a
smaller scale, millions of individuals invest in securities to provide
resources for education, retirement, health care, or a variety of
pursuits and concerns.' 6 On many levels, then, securities play an
integral role in achieving some of the most important goals of our
personal and collective lives.
Adequate regulation, however, remains essential to secure the
multifarious benefits that securities provide to individuals, corporations, and governments. The modern securities regulation regime
itself emerged in the wake of the stock market crash in 1929, which
instantly extinguished massive amounts of wealth and, in turn, led
to the Great Depression.'67 Based on concerns that unregulated
markets could not produce adequate levels of corporate disclosures
or provide sufficient protection to investors from stock price
manipulation and fraud, 6 ' Congress established the backbone of the
makes the securities regulation regime especially amenable to the institutional approach. In
contrast, where the identification or definition of an institution remains highly contestable,
an institutional analysis may indeed prove less instructive. For a discussion of the challenges
in identifying certain "bounded" institutions, see Neuborne, supra note 14, at 801-06.
163. HAZEN, supra note 119, § 1.1[1].
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 14-15 (2005); LOUIS LOSS
& JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 35-36 (5th ed. 2004); Sec. and
Exch. Comm'n, 50 Years of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, in MARC I.
STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 8-9 (4th ed. 2004); Williams, supra note 29, at 1223.
168. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES
REGULATION 12 (2002); see also HAZEN, supranote 167, at 15 ("'he congressional hearings
which culminated in the first federal securities legislation are replete with examples of
outrageous conduct by securities promoters that most certainly had a disastrous impact on
our nation's economy."). See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE
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securities regulation framework by passing the Securities Act of
1933169 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934170
(Exchange Act). Other significant securities laws followed, 7 ' each
designed to repose confidence in the U.S. capital markets and in the
corporate disclosures upon which investors make their decisions.' 72
In addition, as the central policy-making and enforcement
agency in the securities regulation realm, the SEC promulgates
rules and regulations under the various securities laws and
monitors instances of fraud and corporate impropriety.'7 3 Although
some criticize the effectiveness of the SEC, it has nonetheless
"played an important role in maintaining the efficiency and
integrity of the American securities markets."'75 Whether prosecuting insider trading, ensuring the fairness of an initial public
offering, regulating a corporate proxy solicitation, or investigating
instances of stock price manipulation over the Internet, the SEC is
''widely regarded as the nation's finest independent regulatory

FINANCE 39-72 (3d ed. 2003) (extensively discussing the historical and political forces driving
the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2000).
170. Id. §§ 78a-nn.
171. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2000)); Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (2000));
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2000)); Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768,
54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2000)); Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-253, 53 Stat. 1149 (1939) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (2000)); Public Utility Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803
(1935) (repealed 2005).
172. See, e.g., ROBERTAROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 293 (Oxford Univ. Press
1993).
173. HAZEN, supra note 119, § 1.2[3) [c].
174. See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOzO L. REv. 909, 921-27 (1994)
(criticizing the SEC's expansion despite its obsolescence); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Michael
Pike, Cybergossipor SecuritiesFraud?Some FirstAmendment Guidance in Drawingthe Line,
5 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM, at 15 (Glasser Legal Works 2001), availableat http://www.bowne.
com/newsletters/friendly.asp?storylD=393 (describing the potential chilling effects that the
SEC's regulation of Internet securities fraud might have on other areas of protected speech).
See generally ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION-THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA (1982) (explaining criticisms of the SEC and
suggesting reforms).
175. HAZEN, supra note 167, at 17.
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agency."' 76 With a single-minded zeal for making the U.S. securities
markets an attractive place for capital investment, the SEC
arguably plays a more active role in shaping and enforcing law than
any other governmental agency.
The institutional importance of the securities regulation regime
is also directly related to speech. In order to preserve corporate
transparency and fair trading, securities regulation has historically
depended on speech restrictions.'7 7 The prevention of securities
fraud, market manipulation, proxy solicitation abuses, insider
trading, and a host of other ills addressed by the securities laws are
at least in part based on the same basic
premise that market
178
integrity requires truthful disclosures.
Although the next section provides a detailed exposition of the
various ways in which securities regulation depends on speech
restrictions, the point here is to convey from an institutional
perspective the important connection between First Amendment
values and the securities regulation regime. But unlike other
institutions, such as universities, which are designed to foster the
exchange of ideas unfettered by regulation, 1 79 the institution of
securities regulation is premised upon controlled dissemination of
truthful information. As a result, the connection between First
Amendment values and securities regulation seems strongly
negative.
Thus, not only does the securities regulation regime represent one
of the most important institutions in the United States, but its
institutional role remains primarily tied to ensuring the integrity of
the capital markets. Accordingly, to the extent speech restrictions
remain integral to preserving market integrity, an institutional
approach to the First Amendment would favor greater speech
regulation in that particular setting.

176. Judith Miller, S.E.C.: Watchdog 1929 Lacked, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 31, 1979, at D1.
177. See Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital
Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 51-52 (1989); see also Wolfson, supra note 120, at 277-80
(describing SEC restrictions on speech).
178. Neuborne, supra note 177, at 59-60; see also Bernard S. Black, The Legal and
Institutional Preconditionsfor Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 786-801
(2001).
179. Schauer, supra note 1, at 1274.
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B. The Nexus Between Speech Restrictions and Securities
Regulation
Speech restrictions play a paramount role in the system of
mandatory disclosure and periodic reporting embedded in the U.S.
securities laws. Requiring much more than accurate reporting of
raw financial data,"s the network of securities laws also compels
companies to disclose at various times a host of qualitative
information regarding the company's code of ethics,'' basic business
operations,'8 2 competitive risks, 8 ' legal proceedings,' 84 internal
controls over financial data,' 5 executive compensation policies'8 6
and management's discussion and analysis (MD&A) of the company's financial conditions and operations.'8 7 Depending on the
particular context in which those disclosures are made, such as in
a prospectus for an initial public offering of stock or in a company's
annual report to shareholders, the securities laws provide a panoply
of liability standards for noncompliance.
Examining how an extension of full First Amendment protection
to politically tinged corporate speech might adversely affect the
securities regulation regime perhaps provides the best way to
understand the essential institutional connection between speech
restrictions and regulation of the capital markets. That approach
reveals that in a variety of contexts, from the sale of securities to
periodic corporate reporting, and from antifraud prohibitions to
proxy solicitation requirements, granting expansive First Amendment protection to corporate political speech would unravel some of
the most basic and most important provisions in the U.S. securities
laws. 188

180. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.301-.302 (2006).
181. Id. § 229.406.

182. Id. § 229.101.
183. Id. § 229.305.
184. Id. § 229.103.
185. Id. § 229.308.
186. Id. §§ 229.403-.405.
187. Id. § 229.303.
188. Some of the ideas expressed in this section were inspired by arguments I developed
in an amicus brief submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court in Nike v. Kaaky. See Brief for Domini

Social Investments et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539
U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 1844598.
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1. Gun Jumping and Market ConditioningEncouraged
To the extent the First Amendment protects any corporate speech
that touches a political concern, corporations issuing securities
could engage in a variety of currently prohibited advertising and
public relations activities in order to condition the market prior to
a securities offering. Section 5 of the Securities Act prohibits any
"offer to sell" a security unless a registration statement has been
filed with the SEC.'8 9 Courts and the SEC broadly interpret what
constitutes an offer to sell, and statements about the issuer or the
security during this "pre-filing" period will violate section 5 if the
comments could be reasonably calculated to generate a buying
interest.' 90 In particular, while the SEC encourages issuers to
maintain regular advertising and disclosure practices during the
prefiling period,' 9 ' significantly increased advertising or media
activity will be deemed impermissible "gun jumping" in violation of
section 5, even if the publicity does not mention the securities
offering. 192
Some SEC rules provide insulation from gun jumping liability,
subject to certain conditions. With respect to statements about the
impending securities sale itself, SEC Rule 135 provides a "safe
harbor" from a potential section 5 violation as long as the issuer
comments are limited to eight specified categories of information. 113
If the issuer statements go beyond the information contained in
those specified categories, however, the safe harbor will not insulate
the issuer from liability.9 4 In its Securities Offering Reform of 2005
(SOR of 2005),' 95 the SEC promulgated new Rules 163, 163A, 168
189. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
190. See Solicitations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering, Securities Act Release
No. 7188, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,639, at 86,891-92 (June 27,
1995).
191. See Guidelines for Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in
Registration, Exchange Act Release No. 5180, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,506, at 16,507 (Aug. 16, 1971).
192. See, e.g., Georgeson & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,118, at 87,857 (Mar. 3, 1977); Guidelines for Release of Information
by Issuers Whose Securities are in Registration, 36 Fed. Reg. at 16,507; In re Competitive
Capital Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 9184, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,142, at 80,464 (May 25, 1971).
193. 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (2006).
194. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970).
195. Securities Act Release No. 8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,772 (July 19, 2005), 2005 WL
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and 169.196 Although the new rules relax substantially the gun
jumping prohibitions for existing public companies, 19 7 the rules
retain the market conditioning limitations for first time issuers of
securities. 9 ' At least with respect to new issuers, then, in order to
prevent "gun jumping" activities that unfairly condition the market
in advance of an offering, section 5 and Rule 135 provide strict
limits on what a company may communicate to the public.
Using political speech protections as a shield, however, new
issuers could engage in the very kinds of advertising and publicity
activities currently prohibited under section 5. Consider an
aggressive marketing campaign in advance of an initial public stock
offering for Acme Corporation. The campaign rests on a single ad
that depicts smiling, ruddy workers in Acme factories around the
globe, interspersed with images of poverty and deprivation for those
outside the walls of the Acme plants. At the end of the ad appears
a single phrase "Acme Promotes Freedom--Join Us" accompanied
by the Acme trademark emblem. Even if the ad raises general
public interest in Acme and the breadth of its impressive overseas
operations, the ad arguably represents political speech and urges
others to adopt Acme's principled commitment to bringing the
benefits of economic development to otherwise impoverished
peoples. No matter what the content, the campaign would likely
violate the gun jumping prohibitions in section 5 if the level of
advertising significantly exceeds Acme's past practices. If politically
tinged corporate speech received full First Amendment protection,
however, Acme could vastly increase its advertising activity using
the ad and still remain insulated from section 5.
Taking another example, Acme might like to announce its initial
securities offering using a series of full page print ads titled "How
Acme Promotes Freedom Around the Globe." In addition to reciting
all the information permitted under Rule 135, the ads would detail
Acme's political commitment to expanding freedom in new countries and admonish other companies to join Acme in increasing
economic development in Third World countries by ensuring safe
1692642, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/33-8591.pdf.

196. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.163, .163A, .168, .169 (2006).
197. See id. For further discussion of this issue see HAZEN, supra note 119, §§ 2.3[1]-[3], [5]
(2005 & Supp. 2006); id. § 2.3[4] (2005).
198. See HAZEN, supra note 119, § 2.3[1] (2005).
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labor standards for previously oppressed workers. Without doubt,
such an ad would not enjoy the safe harbor provided by Rule 135
and would run afoul of section 5. Yet, despite the precise content
limitations set forth in rule 135, Acme could ignore those proscriptions as long as the ads announcing the stock offering were inextricably linked to political speech.
By using the First Amendment as a shield and cloaking efforts to
drum up investor interest under the guise of political speech, Acme
could avoid with impunity the strict limitations on gun jumping and
market conditioning established through section 5 and Rule 135.
2. Investor SolicitationRules Thwarted
Giving corporate speech broad First Amendment protection would
enable issuers to use currently impermissible "free writing" and
nonconforming prospectuses as part of their sales efforts. Even after
filing a registration statement with the SEC, section 5 of the
Securities Act still prohibits issuers from soliciting using a prospectus that does not conform to the stringent and detailed content
requirements for a "statutory prospectus" set forth in section 10.199
Similar to the broad interpretation given an "offer to sell," courts
and the SEC construe "prospectus" to cover any written offer to sell
a security as well as offers made by radio or television broadcasts.2 °°
The securities laws and regulations provide exceptions to the
requirement that written solicitation materials meet the statutory
prospectus standards. Section 2(a) permits the issuer to make
simple identifying statements2 0 1 and Rule 134 permits publication
of "tombstone" ads that list only highly specified pieces of information about the issuer, the underwriter, and the offering.0 2 Moreover,
in the SOR of 2005, the SEC significantly expanded the conditions
199. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2006).
200. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575-76 (1995); SEC v. Thomas D. Kienlen
Corp., 755 F. Supp. 936, 941 (D. Or. 1991); In re Gold Props. Restoration Co., Securities Act
Release No. 6953, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,045, at 83,332 (Aug.
27, 1992); Transamerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 10621 (May 24, 1978).
201. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (2000) (indicating that the identifying statement should
indicate where a statutory prospectus may be obtained and only "identify the security, state
the price thereof, state by whom orders will be executed, and contain such other information"
as required by the SEC).
202. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (2006).
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under which issuers may use free writing after the filing of a
registration statement. °3 Even the reformed regulations contain
significant limitations, however, such as the requirement that "nonreporting" and "unseasoned"2 " 4 issuers (which include companies
undertaking an initial public stock offering) deliver a statutory
prospectus along with any free writing materials.2 °5 Unless a
statutory exception applies, section 5 prohibits using any prospectus
that fails to conform to the statutory prospectus requirements and
no other "free writing," such as glossy promotional materials, may
even accompany a statutory prospectus.
In much the same manner that issuers could condition the
market using political speech, issuers could use a broad grant of
First Amendment protection to sidestep the prohibition on
nonconforming prospectuses and free writing. Again using Acme
Corporation as an example, Acme might like to enhance the
attractiveness of its initial public offering solicitation with a glossy
portfolio that includes "Acme Position Papers" on hot political
topics specially tailored to the interests of recipients. Registered
Republicans might receive a statement about Acme's commitment
to the Republican agenda, while Democrats might receive a similar
promise to support Democratic initiatives. Female recipients might
also receive an additional position paper describing Acme's staunch
advocacy of women's rights, while men might find another position
paper demanding more public spending on prostate cancer research.
Regardless of the impact on Acme's ability to increase interest in its
securities, those extra communications (if not accompanied by a
statutory prospectus) obviously violate the restrictions provided in
section 5. But even if those "position papers" seem disingenuous and
distract investors from the required information set forth in the
statutory prospectus, those solicitation materials would be immune
203. See id. §§ 230.163, .168, .405, .433; HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW

HANDBOOK § 5.13-.15 (2006).
204. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, 2005 WL 1692642,
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/finalarchive/finalarchive2OO5.shtml; see also
HAZEN, supra note 119, § 2.2, n. 13.10 (Supp. 2006) ("A non-reporting issuer would be an
issuer that is not required to file reports pursuant to Sections 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange
Act," and "[a]n unseasoned issuer would be an issuer that is required to file reports pursuant
to Sections 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, but does not satisfy the requirements of Form S-3
or Form F-3 for a primary offering of its securities.").
205. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.433 (2006); BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 203, § 5.14.
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from regulation if mixed political and commercial speech were to
receive blanket protection under the First Amendment.
Adopting a less aggressive strategy, Acme might simply include
in its Rule 134 tombstone ad certain political statements that
increase market attention. Imagine a tombstone ad for an upcoming
common stock offering that states, in jumbo lettering, "ACME
SUPPORTS THE WAR ON TERROR-WE WILL NEVER FORGET
9/11," followed by a lengthy analysis of Acme's political position.
Although Rule 134 prohibits the use of pictures other than the
issuer's logo or trademark, °6 Acme might use a giant multicolored
graphic of the American flag as the backdrop for its endorsement of
military action. As long as the speech represents a political comment, broad First Amendment protection for corporate political
speech would insulate Acme from liability under section 5.
In the end, expanding the First Amendment to protect politically
tinged corporate speech would undermine fundamental provisions
of the Securities Act that are necessary to prevent manipulation of
investor attitudes and the information upon which reasoned
investment decisions are based. Increasing corporate participation
in general political debates would thus come at a very high cost to
the integrity of U.S. capital markets.
3. SecuritiesAct Antifraud Provisions Sidestepped
Interpreting the First Amendment to insulate from constitutional
review any politically tinged corporate speech would limit dramatically the availability of causes of action under sections 11 and 12 of
the Securities Act.2 7 Section 11 provides that if a registration
statement for the sale of any securities, at the time it was declared
effective, "contained an untrue statement of a material fact or
omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading," any

206. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,887, at 79,345 (May 23, 1984); see also
Associates First Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WNL 25435 (Nov. 26, 1981) (stating
that "Rule 134 does not provide for graphic illustrations in advertisements by non-investment
companies").
207. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (2000).
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purchaser of the security may bring a civil cause of action. °8
Potentially liable parties include the issuer, its directors, the officers
who sign the registration statement, the underwriters, and any
experts named in the registration statement.2" 9 The issuer suffers
strict liability for any material misstatements, regardless of the
degree of care exercised.2 10 In contrast, the remaining defendants
can insulate themselves from liability upon proving they acted with
"due diligence" in investigating the disclosures contained in the
registration statement.2"1 '
Complementing the provisions in section 11, the Securities Act
offers a second layer of antifraud protection under section 12.
Pursuant to section 12, any purchaser enjoys a right of rescission
when an offer to sell a security based on a prospectus or oral
communication includes "an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading. 21 2 Revealing the variety of legal standards
embedded in the securities laws, section 12 does not impose on
issuers the same strict liability under section 11. Instead, all
potential defendants, including the issuer, may escape liability
under section 12 by proving they did not know, and with "the
exercise of reasonable care" could not have known, about the
material misstatement or omission.2 13
Affording politically tinged corporate speech full protection under
the First Amendment would undercut substantially the antifraud
protections under both sections 11 and 12. With respect to issuer
liability under section 11, a material misstatement or omission
sufficiently connected to a matter of public concern would receive
blanket protection from constitutional review rather than expose
the issuer to strict liability for market deception. Moreover,
extending broad protection to corporate political speech could render
all but irrelevant the "due diligence" and "reasonable care" defenses
provided under sections 11 and 12. Quite simply, it would not be
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. § 77k(a).
Id.
See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1983).
Id. at 382.
15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2).
Id.
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necessary to exercise reasonable care or due diligence in avoiding
material misstatements or omissions if corporate disclosures could
be intertwined with political commentary. To avoid the potentially
high costs of investigation, verification, and oversight necessary to
secure the due diligence and reasonable care defenses, issuers and
the other potentially liable parties who control the registration
process might opt for the much less expensive option of combining
the most precarious corporate disclosures with political commentary. If corporate political speech rights trump the antifraud
provisions under sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act, companies
will face a strong incentive to engage in an artful alchemy of mixing
any potentially fraudulent disclosures with just enough political
content to evade liability.
The facility with which companies could engage in that artful
alchemy should cause great alarm. After all, the mandatory
disclosure and reporting requirements contained in the securities
laws involve both qualitative and quantitative disclosures.2 14
Clearly, the qualitative disclosures remain most susceptible to
manipulation, with descriptive evaluations of company trends and
risks easily couched in language evoking some political concern. But
even when the securities laws compel disclosure of seemingly
unadorned facts about business practices or operations, those
factual disclosures may also be strategically embedded in an
amalgam of political and commercial speech. Nike's claim that its
seemingly factual disclosures about the company's overseas labor
practices deserved full First Amendment protection because the
statements were part of an ongoing public debate provides just one
example of the artful alchemy at work."' Although Nike attempted
to evade the reach of a state consumer fraud statute, there is no
reason to expect that same strategy of commingling commercial and
political speech- would not be employed by a company when
compelled to disclose facts about labor practices or environmental
litigation under the securities laws."'6 As companies, or more
specifically the experts who prepare their registration statements,
214. See infra notes 227-34 and accompanying text (discussing the particular disclosures
required by Regulation S-K as applied to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act).
215. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 656-57,664-65 (2003) (per curiam) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
216. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2006).
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routinely intertwine political and commercial speech in an effort to
insulate corporate disclosures from liability, the antifraud protections under the Securities Act will become wholly impotent.
4. Exchange Act FraudRules Circumvented
In much the same way that insulating mixed commercial and
political speech from regulation would debilitate the Securities Act
fraud provisions, extending broad First Amendment protection to
corporate speech would severely curtail antifraud causes of action
arising under sections 10(b) and 14 of the Exchange Act and related
SEC Rules.2 17 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5
prohibit the use of a materially misleading statement, omission, or
any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities."' Those prohibitions cover a variety
of contexts, including press releases, disclosures in annual or
quarterly reports, and Internet communications.2 19 The Supreme
Court has long recognized a private cause of action under 10b-5, but
imposing liability on an issuer, its directors, or its executive officers
requires proof that the misstatement or omission was made with
"scienter"-that is, with intent or recklessness.22 ° Thus, in contrast
to the level of proof needed to establish the "due diligence" and
"reasonable care" defenses available under the Securities Act, a
much higher level of proof is required for a plaintiff to maintain a
successful 10b-5 claim.
Turning to another antifraud provision of the Exchange Act,
section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 prohibit the use of materially misleading statements or omissions in connection with the solicitation of
shareholder votes or "proxies."22 ' With the Supreme Court recognizing an implied right of action for shareholders to sue an issuer, its
directors, or officers under Rule 14a-9,222 affected shareholders may
217. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).

218. 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
219. See HAZEN, supra note 119, § 12.9; Robert A. Prentice, The Future of Corporate

Disclosure: The Internet, Securities Fraud, and Rule 10b-5, 47 EMORY L.J. 1 (1998); LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 167, at 950-51.
220. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2006).
222. See Cent. Bank of Denver, NA. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
171 (1994); Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1086-87 (1991).
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seek both injunctive relief and money damages caused by the fraud.
Again demonstrating the variety of liability standards woven
throughout the securities laws, maintaining a Rule 14a-9 claim does
not require proof of scienter. In contrast to Rule 10b-5, maintaining
a cause of action for proxy fraud simply requires proof of
negligence.22 3 Perhaps betokening the special importance of fairness
in the shareholder voting process, 224 Rule 14-a9 provides a rather
low threshold for liability.
Huddling politically tinged corporate speech under the First
Amendment's umbrella of protection, however, would significantly
undercut the viability of fraud claims under sections 10 and 14 of
the Exchange Act. With respect to a 10b-5 claim, to the extent
overcoming strict scrutiny would require more than proof of scienter
(for example, requiring reliance and actual damages) even reckless
or intentionally misleading statements could escape liability. That
possibility could lead to disastrous results for investors. For
example, Acme Corporation might state the following in the
"Description of Business-International Markets" section of its
annual report:22 5 "In an effort to promote individual freedom and
international cooperation, Acme remains dedicated to expanding
operations in China." For many market analysts, such a move would
mark a significant corporate policy with potentially far-reaching
effects (either positive or negative) on the company's operations and
profitability. But to the extent mixed commercial and political
speech deserves full First Amendment protection, Acme's politically
tinged disclosure would become immune from liability even if made
recklessly or with knowledge of its falsity. Of course, such brazenly
false statements lie at the very core of the kind of fraud Rule 10b-5
aims to prevent. Granting corporations expansive political speech
rights could thus render utterly ineffective one of the most important antifraud provisions in the securities laws.
Affording broad protection to politically tinged corporate speech
becomes even more problematic in the context of a 14a-9 claim.
Were Acme's disclosure about its intention to expand operations in
China contained in a proxy solicitation, liability would attach simply

223. Shidler v. All Am. Life & Fin. Corp., 775 F.2d 917, 926-27 (8th Cir. 1985).
224. See Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1103.
225. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2006).
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by demonstrating the statement was negligently made. While it may
seem odd that the securities law would provide a variety of standards for assessing the same potentially fraudulent statement, the
disparity in those standards arguably reflects the relative importance of the harm suffered from fraud in different settings. In light
of the importance of shareholder voting rights and proxy solicitation
to the integrity of the capital markets,22 6 the Exchange Act and SEC
Rules provide investors with an increased level of protection
through a lower threshold for culpability. Collapsing the distinction
between commercial and political speech, however, would eviscerate
the context-specific distinctions in antifraud protection prescribed
by the securities laws. Regardless of any heightened protection from
deceptive speech that Rule 14a-9 intends to afford investors,
corporations could easily avoid liability by commingling otherwise
risky commercial disclosures with political content.
5. PeriodicReporting Rendered Unreliable
Granting full First Amendment protection to corporate speech
touching some political chord would render unreliable numerous
required disclosures under the securities laws. For instance, Item
101 of Regulation S-K, the omnibus disclosure regulation under the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act,22 7 requires companies to
provide detailed narrative disclosures regarding the company in
various periodic reports and offering documents.22 In addition to
compelling a multiyear historical description of the general
development of the business,22 9 Item 101 requires a forward-looking
narrative of "the business done and intended to be done" by the
company, 23° an assessment of "positive and negative factors
pertaining to the competitive position" of the business,2"' an
evaluation of "risks attendant to the foreign operations" of the corporation, 232 a discussion of the potential affects [sic] of governmental
226. See Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1103.
227. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10-. 1123 (2006); see also LOSS & SELIGMAN, supranote 167, at 15587 (providing an overview of Regulation S-K).
228. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2006).
229. Id. § 229.101(a).
230. Id. § 229.101 (c)(1).
231. Id. § 229.101 (c)(1)(x).
232. Id. § 229.101 (d)(3).
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termination or renegotiation of important contracts, 233 and a
detailed disclosure of material effects resulting from compliance
with federal, state, and local environmental laws.2 34
If corporate speech touching some political chord were to receive
full First Amendment protection, the potential, if not essential,
political nature of each of those required disclosures would render
corporate responses especially suspect. With respect to the required
disclosure of material effects of compliance with environmental
laws, a company could encumber its response with a political
comment that would render the disclosure utterly misleading and
useless to investors. For example, even though Acme might spend
billions of dollars each year engaged in compliance with a variety of
environmental laws, the company might state in its annual report:
"Acme expends only minimal resources in complying with all valid
environmental laws and regulations in the United States." How
could Acme escape liability for such an ostensibly false disclosure
given the resources it dedicates to compliance? The statement might
reflect a political judgment that current environmental laws are
unconstitutional or that Acme should be exempt from the reach of
the statutory requirements. Thus, regardless of the arguably
intentional deception, the statement would remain insulated from
liability if inextricably linked to political commentary. That same
type of investor manipulation could occur in a host of other disclosure categories that entail some political component.
Once investors recognize that the political nature of certain
required disclosures provides an opportunity for gross corporate
manipulation and deception, investors might simply fail to take
seriously company responses on those matters. That lack of trust in
the accuracy of corporate disclosures would have a devastating
effect on the SRI community, which screens companies based on
their social, political, and environmental commitments. Moreover,
the resulting impracticality in distinguishing between corporations
with stellar versus abysmal social, environmental, or political
records would eliminate the market's ability to reward companies
that embrace corporate social responsibility." 5 While previous
233. Id. § 229.101 (c)(1)(ix).
234. Id. § 229.101 (c)(1)(xii).
235. Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud ProhibitionsAre Not Enough: The Significance of
Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory Securities
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sections addressed the negative impact that broad corporate speech
rights would have on the viability of investor fraud actions,2 3 6 the
problem here strikes more closely at the very heart of the system of
compelled disclosure and reporting itself. If the First Amendment
shields companies from liability whenever the nature of the
required disclosure touches some political matter, compelling
corporations to speak on those issues would be pointless. Such a
fundamental flaw in the ability of the securities laws to ensure the
public receives accurate information would significantly undermine
confidence in the capital markets, especially when an increasing
number of investors demand full and fair disclosure regarding
certain inherently political matters.23 7 Affording corporations broad
political speech rights thus would render unreliable a variety of
important disclosure requirements in the existing securities laws
and frustrate the ability of investors to make sufficiently informed
choices.
6. "SuperSafe Harbors"Created
Providing First Amendment protection to politically tinged
corporate speech would undermine the usefulness of management's
discussion and analysis of business operations by creating a "super
safe harbor" for forward-looking statements. Pursuant to Item 303
of Regulation S-K, a company must provide management's discussion and analysis of current operations and plans for the future in
its periodic reports and prospectuses used to sell securities.2 38 That
detailed narrative from company management provides "in one
section of a filing, material historical and prospective textual
disclosure enabling investors and other users to assess the financial
condition and results of operations of the registrant, with particular
' Not only
emphasis on the registrant's prospects for the future."2 39
Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 223, 258 ('[Ojpportunistic issuers adversely affect
economic efficiency by devaluing the disclosure of issuers generally, and in particular the
disclosure of candid issuers.").
236. See supraPart IV.B.3-4.
237. See supraPart I.B.
238. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2006).
239. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 54
Fed. Reg. 22,427, at 22,428 (May 18, 1989).
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should the MD&A reflect positive business developments that
management anticipates, but the discussion must also entail a
disclosure of negative trends and uncertainties likely to have a
4
material adverse effect on the company.1 1
Even though the MD&A rules mandate discussion of trends and
uncertainties, companies might still face liability under sections 11
and 12 of the Securities Act or Rule 10b-5 for fraud based on
material misstatements or omissions contained in the MD&A
narrative.2 41 To encourage full disclosure, the securities laws offer
certain "safe harbor" provisions that effectively insulate a company
from liability based on "forward-looking" statements or projections,
under certain circumstances.2 42 For instance, Rule 175 of the
Securities Act and Rule 3b-6 of the Exchange Act shield a corporation from liability for forward-looking statements unless those
statements were not made in "good faith" and "with a reasonable
basis. 2 43 Complementing those rules, section 21E of the Exchange
Act eliminates liability for forward-looking statements accompanied
by "meaningful cautionary statements" that identify important
factors potentially affecting management's predictions or forecasts.24 4 Even in the absence of meaningful cautionary language,
however, section 21E provides that liability will result only if the
forward-looking statements were made with "actual knowledge" of
2 45
their falsity or misleading nature.
Despite the fine gradations in protection under the existing safe
harbor provisions, affording mixed commercial and political speech
full First Amendment protection would create an unintended "Super
Safe Harbor" for forward-looking statements. While at first blush
the disparity in the "meaningful cautionary statements" mechanism, "good faith" or "rational basis" requirements, and an "actual
knowledge" threshold for fraud liability might seem a bit disjointed,
those safe harbor standards arguably reflect a delicate balance
240. Id.
241. See, e.g., Wallace v. Sys. & Computer Tech. Corp., No. Civ. A. 95-CV-6303, 1997 WL
602808, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1997) (finding that failure to comply with Item 303 of
Regulation S-K might amount to a Rule 10b-5 violation).
242. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175, 240.3b-6 (2006).
243. Id. §§ 230.175, 240.3b-6.
244. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i) (2000); see Ehlert v. Singer, 245 F.3d 1313, 1318 (1 1th Cir.
2001).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
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between investors' need for descriptive information beyond raw
financial data (such as management's views on positive trends and
future risks) and management's desire for reasonable protection
from liability for providing that analysis. Creating a Super Safe
Harbor for any politically tinged forward-looking statements would
unsettle the existing balance. As a result, a bad faith business
projection unadorned by "meaningful cautionary statements" could
escape liability even if made with "actual knowledge" of its falsity,
to the extent overcoming strict scrutiny would require demonstration of reliance or actual damages.2 4 If the First Amendment
creates a "super safe harbor" that enables companies to deceive
investors by generating false market expectations, MD&A disclosures may likely promote market inefficiency rather than corporate
transparency.
7. Plain English Requirement Ignored
The plain English requirements promulgated by the SEC were
adopted to make disclosures more easily understandable to an
ordinary investor.24 7 According to the SEC, in drafting disclosures
companies should use short sentences, active voice, everyday
language, bullet lists, and tabular presentations, while avoiding
legal jargon, technical business terms, and multiple negatives.2 4 8
Although a failure to abide by the plain English mandate does not
give investors a private cause of action, the SEC still enforces the

246. In Nike, the company argued that the Court should adopt an "actual malice" standard
to assess the validity of politically tinged corporate speech. See supra note 36 and
accompanying text. Embracing an actual malice standard would eviscerate and perhaps
render unconstitutional some of most important provisions in the securities laws. For
example, since recklessness marks the threshold conduct for liability under actual malice,
strict liability for issuers under section 11 would be extinguished. See supranotes 212-15 and
accompanying text. Likewise, the "due dilgence" and "reasonable care" defenses for nonissuers would become meaningless, because a malice standard would require a much greater
degree of malfeasance for liability to attach. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
Along the same lines, suffering liability for negligence under section 14 of the Exchange Act
and Rule 14a-9 would be constitutionally impermissible. See supra notes 221-26 and
accompanying text.
247. See Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 33-7497, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370
(Feb. 6, 1998).
248. Id.
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rule.2 49 If insulated by the First Amendment, however, companies
could ignore the plain English requirements to the extent forced
revision of language or style somehow affects the content of a
political comment. Most certainly, First Amendment concerns over
the expression of a political viewpoint would trump the plain
English mandates, even if those stylistic requirements significantly
enhance accurate and adequate corporate disclosures. To some
perhaps, the limited demise of the plain English requirements may
not seem terribly troublesome. Still, the incompatibility of the plain
English requirements with an overly expansive interpretation of the
First Amendment demonstrates that enhancing corporate participation in political debates might come at the expense of effective
regulation of U.S. capital markets.
8. ShareholderProposalsThreatened
Extending full First Amendment protection to corporate speech
could have particularly serious implications for the viability of
shareholder proposals. Pursuant to Rule 14a-8 of the Exchange Act,
shareholders can require a company to include shareholder
resolutions in the company's annual proxy statement, subject to
certain conditions."' Through these resolutions, companies are
forced to bring social, environmental, economic, and corporate
governance issues to the attention of other shareholders. In that
regard, the shareholder proposal mechanism represents an important tool regularly used by shareholders to encourage stronger
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility.2 5 '
The number of proposals introduced by shareholders has
increased markedly in the past decade.25 2 Recent examples of
shareholder proposals include resolutions at Exxon Mobil to prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation; PepsiCo, Inc. to develop
a comprehensive recycling program; Newell-Rubbermaid, Inc. to
249. See, e.g., Royce de R. Barondes, Adequacy of Disclosureof Restrictionson FlippingIPO
Securities, 74 TUL. L. REV. 883, 910 n.158 (2000) ("The importance placed on this matter is
illustrated by the fact that a substantial portion-in some cases, over half--of the SEC
comments on recent IPO prospectuses have concerned stylistic matters.").
250. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2006).
251. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text; see also SIF REPORT, supra note 2, at
21-22.
252. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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reduce emissions and global warming; and Morgan Stanley to limit
executive compensation." 3 Some proposals strike a particularly
political chord, such as the New York City Pension Fund's recent
proposal that Aon Corporation sever all business ties with Iran.254
Regardless of the subject matter, the trend in using shareholder
proposals to effect corporate change remains on a steady rise.
Since all these shareholder resolutions touch issues of public
concern, were politically tinged corporate speech afforded full First
Amendment protection, a company could assert that the basic
requirement under Rule 14a-8 to include shareholder resolutions in
the annual proxy solicitation violates the company's political speech
rights. That concern becomes especially relevant in light of the
decision in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. striking down compelled
disclosure of political speech.255 Particularly given the variety of
corporate governance scandals in recent years, 5 6 undermining
corporate accountability through shareholder advocacy and
oversight may seem institutionally inappropriate.

V. NIKE REVISITED
Does the forgoing institutional analysis provide any help in
resolving the claims presented in Nike? The answer is an unequivocal no. But why?An institutional approach to the First Amendment
requires a detailed assessment of the specific institutional context
within which the contested speech limitations arise.257 Determining
whether politically tinged corporate speech should remain immune
from the reach of a state consumer fraud statute, thus, must entail
an assessment of the particular institution of consumer protection,

253. See Interfaith Center on Corporation Responsibility, 2005 Socially Responsible
Shareholder Resolutions, http://www.iccr.org/shareholder/proxy-.book05/05statuschart.php
(last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
254. See Comptroller Thompson" City Pension Funds Prompt Aon To Sever Ties to Iran,
U.S. ST. NEWS, Jan. 23, 2006, availableat 2006 WLNR 1277610.
255. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
256. See Patty M. DeGaetano, The ShareholderDirectAccess Teeter-Totter: Will Increased
ShareholderVoice in the DirectorNomination ProcessProtect Investors?, 41 CAL. W. L. REV.
361,364-75 (2005) (discussing scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and Adelphia); Claudia H.
Deutsch, Revolt of the Shareholders;At Annual Meetings, Anger Will Ratchet Up a Notch, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, § 3,at 1.

257. Schauer, supranote 1, at 1277; see supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
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and of the nexus between speech regulation and the basic functioning of that institution.
An institutional approach to the First Amendment may indeed
prove quite useful in answering the questions raised in Nike,
especially considering the intellectual limits of the Supreme Court's
existing speech jurisprudence regarding commercial speech and
corporate political speech.25 9 But an analysis of the institutional
importance of securities regulation simply provides no relevant
insights into the wholly separate institutional setting of consumer
fraud regulation. The very crux of the case for an institutional
approach rests on a recognition that specific institutional contexts
matter when assessing speech rights. Failing to recognize the
importance of institutional boundaries would undermine the basic
claim that institutions should be taken seriously in First Amendment jurisprudence.6 °
So does the institutional analysis of securities regulation provide
any help in determining whether corporations should enjoy full
First Amendment protection for politically tinged corporate speech?
To that question, the institutional analysis provides a much clearer
answer. Considering the extraordinary importance of the securities
regulation regime to American society and the inextricability of the
link between speech regulations and the basic functioning of that
institution, a strong institutional argument supports carving out
from the First Amendment's reach the system of mandatory
disclosure and reporting embedded in the U.S. securities laws.
For some, the added value of such an institutional analysis may
seem negligible in light of the Supreme Court's apparent exemption
of the securities regulation regime from serious First Amendment
scrutiny."' The point of the institutional analysis, however, is not
to quarrel with that decision to insulate the securities laws from
constitutional review. Instead, the institutional approach intends to
provide a principled anchor for what otherwise seems an ad hoc, if
not arbitrary, pronouncement disconnected from existing speech
jurisprudence.

258.
259.
260.
261.

Schauer, supra note 1, at 1274; see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
Schauer, supra note 1, at 1273.
See supra Part 1.C.
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Of course, an institutional approach to the First Amendment does
not provide any bright-line tests or standards for determining the
proper scope of speech rights.2" 2 Perhaps existing speech jurisprudence already suffers from enough tests, bright-line or otherwise,
without adding more to the mix. Still, the lack of a discreet and
detailed framework for assessing the importance of institutions and
the nexus between speech and the basic functioning of those
institutions may make us less sanguine about the institutional
approach's usefulness. After all, what level of institutional importance requires insulation from the First Amendment? At what point
do the connections between institutional function and speech
become too ambiguous for drawing any meaningful conclusions
about the propriety of speech regulation?2 6 3 To those important
questions, the institutional approach remains frustratingly vague.
Despite those limitations, the value of the institutional approach
lies in its ability both to address more coherently difficult speech
cases and to resolve more efficiently a core of cases in a particular
institutional setting. The collision between the Supreme Court's
commercial speech doctrine and its approach to political speech
remains inevitable as corporations continue to press their political
speech rights. When that collision happens, the Court will have to
retool at least some of the current definitions, standards, and tests
that can no longer provide sufficient guidance. That restructuring
may even produce greater uncertainty if the Court continues to
evade defining the boundaries between commercial and political
speech.
The institutional approach, however, can provide some clarity
amidst the confusion. Even in hard cases when existing speech
principles might not provide much guidance, to the extent the
context involves institutions vital to American life and the basic
functions of those institutions depend on speech regulation (or free
speech), the institutional approach provides strong arguments for
regulation (or freedom from regulation). Once that institutional
analysis pulls with sufficient strength in one direction, a core set of
cases within that institutional setting can be rather easily resolved.
262. Schauer, supra note 1, at 1273.
263. For general criticism of Schauer's institutional approach, see Carpenter, supra note
134.
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Applied to the realm of securities regulation, then, the institutional approach provides a sufficiently strong intellectual anchor to
keep the system of mandatory reporting and disclosure embedded
in the U.S. securities laws outside the First Amendment's reach.
Embracing the institutional approach would effectively rescue the
securities regulation regime from drifting aimlessly in constitutional
uncertainty and help ensure that the integrity of the U.S. capital
markets would not fall victim to the impending jurisprudential
collision between commercial and corporate political speech.
CONCLUSION

An institutional approach seems to provide significant principled
grounds for permitting greater speech regulation, at least when
applied in the realm of securities regulation. The analysis proves
especially helpful in that particular context, because the Supreme
Court has not provided any clear reasons to explain why the
securities laws should sit outside the protective reach of the First
Amendment. Quite to the contrary, existing speech jurisprudence
casts some doubt about the continuing viability of a robust securities regulation regime. For those concerned about maintaining the
integrity of the capital markets, incorporating a respect for institutions into existing First Amendment theory would provide great
solace. Absent that analytical adjustment, securities laws would
remain rather vulnerable to attack should corporations press for
greater political speech rights.
The usefulness of the institutional approach in explaining why
the First Amendment should permit greater speech regulation in
the securities regulation context also seems to provide at least
anecdotal support for the theory as a valuable analytical tool. Of
course, that the institutional approach provides some strong
insights in one particular context does not necessarily imply the
theory would work equally well in every institutional setting. As
with many areas of life and law, the proof is in the pudding. But, as
Schauer suggests in advocating this new method of constitutional
inquiry, "it may be worthwhile to look at what such an approach
might yield."2"4 This Article takes Schauer up on his invitation in
264. Schauer, supra note 1, at 1273.
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the realm of securities regulation. And as scholars with expertise in
other institutional settings examine the institutional approach's
usefulness in different contexts, support for the theory itself may
wax or wane. Whether the theory gains enough positive momentum
to become a permanent part of First Amendment jurisprudence,
thus remains a question for further study. An analysis of the
institutional approach in the realm of securities regulation at least
serves to get the intellectual ball rolling.

